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Introduction
It is a truism to say that conventional international humanitarian law
(IHL) regulates international armed conﬂict (IAC) far more extensively
than non-international armed conﬂict (NIAC). In IAC, conventional
IHL – the four Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol –
authorizes both targeting and detention and carefully circumscribes their
use. In NIAC, by contrast, conventional IHL – Common Article 3 and
the Second Additional Protocol – is silent on the authorization for
targeting and detention and prescribes only rudimentary limits on when
individuals may be targeted or detained.
Like nature, however, international law abhors a vacuum. Many of the
gaps in the conventional IHL of NIAC have been slowly ﬁlled by custom.
In its groundbreaking study, for example, the ICRC concluded that
138 of the 161 customary rules of IHL now apply in both IAC and
NIAC – nearly 86%.2 A number of those customary rules simply parallel
provisions in the Second Additional Protocol3 (AP II), such as the
prohibition on attacking civilians4 and the obligation to protect the
wounded and sick.5 But others go well beyond AP II, particularly con-
cerning “the basic principles on the conduct of hostilities and. . . rules
on speciﬁcally protected persons and objects and speciﬁc methods of
1 My thanks to Nastasia Bach for her exceptional research assistance.
2 See Emily Crawford, Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinc-
tion between International and Non-international Armed Conﬂicts, 20 Leiden Journal of
International Law 441, 457 (2007).
3 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conﬂicts, Art. 1, 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (1977).
4 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law: Volume 1: Rules, Rule 1 (2005).
5 Id., Rules 109–11.
232
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316481103.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 13:06:50, subject to the Cambridge Core
warfare.”6 As a result, it is now common for scholars to claim that, with
the notorious exceptions of the combatant’s privilege and POW status,
very few critical differences remain between IAC and NIAC concerning
the applicable rules of IHL.7
From a positivist perspective, of course, the gradual harmonization of
IAC andNIAC through convention and custom is unproblematic. Both are
formal sources of international law.8 Since 9/11, however, the United States
has consistently taken the position that certain IAC-based rules of IHL can
be applied in NIAC via a third method: analogy. The U.S. has argued, for
example, that it can target members of any organized armed group that
would qualify as a “co-belligerent” of al-Qaeda under IAC rules.9 Similarly,
by analogizing to the “persons accompanying” provision of the Third
Geneva Convention10 (GC III), the U.S. has argued that it can detain
individuals who are notmembers of al-Qaeda but substantially support it.11
In assessing the legitimacy of such analogies, it is tempting to focus on
whether it makes sense to apply a particular IAC rule in NIAC.12 Is the
Haqqani Network’s relationship with al-Qaeda really equivalent to Italy’s
relationship with Nazi Germany? Are individuals who regularly cook for
members of al-Qaeda really like supply contractors working with the U.S.
Armed Forces? Emphasizing the substantive “ﬁt” between IAC and
NIAC, however, simply obscures a more fundamental question: Where
does the U.S.’s authority to analogize between IAC and NIAC come from?
That is a critical question, for two reasons. First, targeting and
detention each potentially violate the human rights of the individuals
they affect. As the International Law Commission (ILC) has noted, it is
not enough for targeting or detention to qualify as a legitimate act of
6 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 87 Int’l
Rev. Red Cross 175, 189 (2005).
7 See Crawford, supra note 2, at 462–65.
8 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993 at 25, 3
Bevans 1199.
9 See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 7, Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d
63 (D.D.C. March 13, 2009) (No. 05–763), ECF No. 175.
10 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(A)(1) and
(2), August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
11 See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive Number 2310.01E (August 19, 2014),
Appendix, at 14.
12 See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty to
Hack?, Temple University Research PaperNo. 2014-16, at 16 (May 27, 2014) (noting that “[a]
nalogical reasoning requires that the context from which the analogy originates shares
sufﬁciently relevant similarities (and no relevant dissimilarities) with the targeted context”).
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self-defense under Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter; that targeting or detention
must also be consistent with either IHL or international human rights
law (IHRL), depending on which legal regime applies.13 By expanding its
ability to target and detain, therefore, the U.S.’s use of analogy increases
the number of acts that it must justify under IHL or IHRL.
Second, because all of the targeting and detention activities that occur
in the NIAC between the U.S. and al-Qaeda take place extraterritorially,
each U.S. use of force and each capture operation potentially violates the
sovereignty of the state on whose territory it takes place. The U.S.’s
analogies between IAC and NIAC greatly expand its ability to target
and detain extraterritorially; its use of analogy thus signiﬁcantly increases
the number of acts that it must defend as legitimate self-defense.
Put more simply, by relying on analogized rules of IHL to justify
expanded targeting and detention of al-Qaeda, the U.S. potentially runs
afoul of a number of prohibitive rules of international law: the principle
of non-intervention; the prohibition on the use of force; and IHRL
prohibitions on the arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty. What, then,
is the legal basis for those analogies?
This chapter’s answer is straightforward: nothing. There is no basis in
international law for taking rules of IHL that apply as a matter of
convention and custom only in IAC and applying them in NIAC by
analogy. The U.S. is thus systematically violating international law by
relying on those analogized rules to target and detain extraterritorially.
The chapter itself is divided into two sections. Section I traces the rise
of IHRL and the evolution of what has been called “transnational armed
conﬂict”14 in order to explain why there must always be a conventional
or customary basis for extraterritorial targeting and detention. Section II
then explains why the absence of the required conventional or customary
basis dooms each of the IAC-based rules of IHL that the U.S. has applied
in NIAC by analogy.
I. The Necessity of Convention or Custom
Given the considerable practical impact analogized rules of IHL have had
on the U.S.’s targeting and detention practices, we would expect the U.S.
13 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, at 74, A/56/10 (2001).
14 See generally Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conﬂict:
A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 Isr.
L. Rev. 46–79 (2009).
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government (USG) to have provided a robust defense of the legality of
analogy. After all, from a positivist standpoint, it is anything but self-
evident that states are free to analogize at will between IAC and NIAC.
The analogized rules are not applicable in NIAC via conventional law.
They cannot be viewed as general principles of law. And although some
scholars talk about analogizing IAC rules of IHL to NIAC through
customary international law,15 that is not the argument the USG is
making16 – it has never claimed that the rules it applies by analogy have
achieved customary status.
In fact, the USG has never made any attempt whatsoever to explain
why international law permits it to analogize between IAC and NIAC.
With regard to co-belligerency, for example, Jeh Johnson has merely
stated that the U.S. has “publicly deﬁned an ‘associate force’ as [being]. . .
a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners.”17 Similarly, with regard to detention, the Depart-
ment of Justice has simply claimed that the U.S. has the authority to
detain anyone “whose relationship to al-Qaida or the Taliban would, in
appropriately analogous circumstances in a traditional international
armed conﬂict, render them detainable.”18 The USG has not even been
able to articulate a rationale for analogy in response to direct questions
from the judiciary; an exasperated Judge Bates noted during the Hamlily
litigation that “[a]fter repeated attempts by the Court to elicit a more
deﬁnitive justiﬁcation for the ‘substantial support’ concept in the law of
war, it became clear that the government has none.”19
Fortunately for the USG, other judges have proven far more
credulous. The DC Circuit quickly rejected Judge Bates’s conclusion that
15 See, e.g., Noëlle Quénivet, The Moscow Hostage Crisis in the Light of the Armed Conﬂict in
Chechnya, 4 Y.B. Int’l Humanitarian L. 348, 361–62 (2001) (noting that “a way of
arguing that analogy can be made is that ‘there exists, at present, a corpus of customary
international law applicable to all armed conﬂicts irrespective of their characterisation as
international or non-international armed conﬂicts’”) (citation omitted).
16 Silja Voneky, Analogy in International Law, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Inter-
national Law, ¶ 9, available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL (“[O]ne can and
must differentiate between reasoning by analogy and the evidence of a rule of customary
international law, even if there may be cases of doubt which are hard to decide.”).
17 Jeh C. Johnson, The Conﬂict Against Al Qaeda and its Afﬁliates: How Will It End?, Speech
at the Oxford Union, Oxford University (November 30, 2012), available at
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/#_ftn11.
18 Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 9, at 1.
19 Memorandum Opinion, at 18, Hamlily v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05–0763 (JDB)
(D.D.C. 2009).
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“substantial support”did not justify detention inNIAC, andnoother court–
District or Court of Appeals – has ever rejected an attempt by the USG to
apply an IAC rule to NIAC by analogy.20 Like theUSG itself, however, those
courts have uniformly failed to explain why international law permits
analogizing between IAC and NIAC in the absence of a customary basis
for doing so. In Hamlily, for example, the same Judge Bates who showed
such admirable skepticism toward the USG’s “substantial support” analogy
had no problem concluding that co-belligerency could be applied in NIAC.
Why did he reach that conclusion, despite acknowledging that “[l]ike many
other elements of the law of war, co-belligerency is a concept that has
developed almost exclusively in the context of international armed con-
ﬂicts”? Because – and this was the totality of his argument, itself relegated to
a footnote – “there is no reasonwhy this principle is not equally applicable to
non-state actors involved in noninternational conﬂicts.”21
American scholars have also generally failed to articulate a coherent
rationale for analogizing between IAC and NIAC. Bradley and Goldsmith,
for example, simply claim that theU.S. can target al-Qaeda’s co-belligerents
because “the laws of war at a minimum would deem ‘neutrals’ that system-
atically violate the laws of neutrality by supporting or assisting other
terrorist organizations to be lawful military targets.”22 In a similar vein,
Lederman and Vladeck have suggested that “perhaps substantial support-
ers of enemy forces who are apprehended while accompanying such forces
can be detained on roughly the same terms as the forces themselves, just as
they can be in an international conﬂict. Cf. Third Geneva Convention,
art. 4(4).”23 Those scholars do not explain why international law permits
the analogy they endorse; they focus solely on the supposed substantive
desirability of applying a particular IAC-based IHL rule to NIAC.
There is, however, one notable exception to scholarly silence on the
legal basis of analogy: Ryan Goodman. Goodman defends the U.S.’s right
to analogize between IAC and NIAC as follows:
20 As discussed in more detail later, the D.C. Circuit rejected applying co-belligerency to
NIAC by analogy in Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). But it did so
in order to reject a habeas petition ﬁled by a Guantánamo detainee; the USG did argue
analogy in that case.
21 Hamlily Memorandum Opinion, supra note 19, at 16 n 16.
22 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization in the War on Terror,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 2048, 2113 (2005).
23 Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War –
Part I, Opinio Juris (December 31, 2011), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/31/
the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-part-i/ (citation in the original).
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IHL is uniformly less restrictive in internal armed conﬂicts than in
international armed conﬂicts. Accordingly, if states have authority to
engage in particular practices in an international armed conﬂict (e.g.,
targeting direct participants in hostilities), they a fortiori possess the
authority to undertake those practices in noninternational conﬂict.
Simply put, whatever is permitted in international armed conﬂict is
permitted in noninternational armed conﬂict. Hence, if IHL permits
states to detain civilians in the former domain, IHL surely permits states
to pursue those actions in the latter domain.24
Goodman’s defense of analogy appears to be based squarely on the
Permanent Court of International Justice’s seminal judgment in the
Lotus case – its second principle in particular:
It does not . . . follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely
on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception
to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain speciﬁc
cases. But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands
at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most
suitable. This discretion left to States by international law explains the
great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without objec-
tions or complaints on the part of other States.
In these circumstances all that can be required of a State is that it should not
overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction;
within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.25
Goodman’s argument, in other words, seems to be this: (1) the ability of
states to target and detain in armed conﬂict is limited only by prohibitive
rules of IHL; (2) because there are fewer prohibitive IHL rules concerning
targeting and detention in NIAC than in IAC, any targeting or detention
24 Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conﬂict, 48 Am. J. Int’l L. 48, 50
(2009).
25 Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19.
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that is not prohibited in IAC cannot be prohibited in NIAC; (3) states are
thus free to apply IAC-based targeting and detention rules to NIAC,
because by deﬁnition such analogized rules cannot violate a prohibitive
rule of IHL.
The key here is that Goodman is arguing – if only implicitly – that
states are free to analogize between IAC and NIAC as a matter of
domestic law, not international law.26 He is not claiming that inter-
national law itself permits states to apply IAC-based rules to NIAC by
analogy; his point is that states are free to adopt whatever targeting and
detention principles they want in their domestic law unless something
in international law prohibits them from doing so. That is why he can
also insist that the “same logic . . . does not apply to proscriptive rules. If
IHL forbids states from engaging in particular actions in international
armed conﬂicts, it does not necessarily follow that the same prohibition
applies in a noninternational conﬂict.”27 In terms of the second Lotus
principle, the distinction between permissive and prohibitive rules
makes sense: Although there is no need to demonstrate that a particular
permissive rule exists in NIAC as well as in IAC, because states are free
to organize their domestic law of targeting and detention however they
want as long as they do not violate a prohibitive rule, there is a need to
show that a particular prohibitive rule of targeting or detention applies
in NIAC as well as in IAC, because – to quote another part of the Lotus
judgment – “[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot . . .
be presumed.”28
This is a coherent defense of analogy – but one that is ultimately
unpersuasive. Although Goodman’s Lotus-like argument would have
made sense prior to World War II, the rise of universal human rights
and the evolution of transnational NIAC have rendered that argument
obsolete. There are now at least four different prohibitive rules that limit
the freedom of states to apply IAC-based targeting and detention rules to
NIAC solely by analogy – namely, the principle of non-intervention, the
prohibition on the use of force, and IHRL’s rights to life and liberty.
26 Cf. Ashley Deeks, Domestic Humanitarian Law: Developing the Law of War in Domestic
Courts, University of Virginia School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper Series 2013–39, at 18 (October 2013) (distinguishing between international
humanitarian law and domestic humanitarian law, and including in the latter category
situations where “courts must ﬁrst interpret traditional IHL principles and then apply
those principles analogically to a new conﬂict”).
27 Goodman, Detention of Civilians, supra note 24, at 50. 28 Lotus, supra note 25, at 18.
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A. The Absence of International Law
Until the late 1940s, international law had almost nothing to say about
how a state waged what we now call a non-international armed conﬂict.
Because such conﬂicts were generally fought on the state’s own territory,
the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force –
the latter still in its infancy anyway – did not apply. International human
rights law did not yet exist. And prior to the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions in 1949, IHL regulated only international armed conﬂicts –
wars between two or more states.29 The one exception was the rare civil
war in which the insurgents were so organized and hostilities so intense
that third states had both “the right and the duty to grant recognition of
belligerency,”30 which required them to treat the warring parties as if
they were engaged in a traditional international armed conﬂict.31
In this early phase of NIAC’s evolution, the second Lotus principle did
indeed effectively grant a state unfettered discretion to wage war against
an insurgent group. There were simply no prohibitive rules of inter-
national law that limited the kind of targeting and detention rules the
state could adopt as a matter of what Deeks aptly calls “domestic
humanitarian law.” Indeed, the right of a state to determine how it
wanted to combat an insurgency was itself a prohibitive rule of inter-
national law, one that prevented other states from claiming the right to
interfere in the internal conﬂict. As Kretzmer notes, “[a]ny outside
interference was regarded as incompatible with the principle of sover-
eignty, the linchpin of international law in the post-Westphalian era.”32
At this point in time, then, IHL was the state’s enemy, not its friend.
Given that the jus ad bellum did not apply to internal NIACs and IHRL
did not yet exist, IHL provided the only conceivable limits on a state’s
29 David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-International Armed
Conﬂicts, 42 Isr. L. Rev. 8, 13 (2012); Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict 222 (2012).
30 2 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: ATreatise § 76, at 197 (Hersch Lauterpacht
ed., 6th ed. 1940).
31 Yair M. Lootsteen, The Concept of Belligerency in International Law, 166Mil L. Rev. 109,
114 (2000) (“While not conferring statehood, proper recognition of belligerency grants
the rebels substantive protections under the laws of war.”).
32 Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 29, at 13; see also John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power:
The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-International Armed Conﬂict in
an Extraterritorial Context, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 396, 402 (2007) (noting that because conﬂicts
“other than between states” were “traditionally not the concern of international law . . .
[t]he principle of non-intervention generally prevented international regulation of such
conﬂicts”).
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freedom to do whatever it wanted to quell an insurgency. States thus
went to great lengths to prevent third states from recognizing insurgent
groups as belligerents,33 because once a state was involved in a recog-
nized belligerency, it had to extend belligerent rights to the insurgents –
most notably, combatant’s privilege and POW status – or it would lose
its own belligerent rights in the eyes of third states.34 And, of course,
states scrupulously resisted applying any of the major IHL conventions
of the time, such as the 1907 Hague Convention IV and the 1929
Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field,
to civil wars.35
B. The Rise of IHRL
After World War II, the number of prohibitive rules of international
law multiplied exponentially.36 To begin with, conventional IHL began
to regulate NIAC: Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
protects “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” from mis-
treatment in any “armed conﬂict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,”37
while the Second Additional Protocol of 1977 regulates both detention
and targeting in armed conﬂicts that “take place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory.”38
Those conventions, of course, do not regulate NIAC anywhere near
as comprehensively as the Geneva Conventions and First Additional
Protocol regulate IAC. But customary international law has closed
the gaps between the two considerably: as noted earlier, the ICRC
takes the position that only 23 of 161 customary rules of IHL now
apply solely in IAC.39
33 See Lootsteen, supra note 31, at 114 (noting that Britain’s recognition of the Civil War as
a belligerency was “much to the chagrin” of Lincoln).
34 See Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 232 (1947) (“[I]f the
lawful government were to claim belligerent rights whilst denying them to the insurgents,
such illogical and one-sided conduct would invalidate its continued recognition as a
belligerent.”).
35 Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 222. 36 See generally Cerone, supra note 32.
37 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Art. 3, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
38 AP II, supra note 3, Art. 1(1). 39 Crawford, supra note 2, at 457.
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The post-war expansion of conventional and customary IHL into
NIAC was mirrored by the evolution of IHRL. As Rona says, “World
War II gave us the Age of Rights.”40 The watershed moment was the U.N.
General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) in 1948, because its afﬁrmation that “[e]veryone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person,”41 regardless of “the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a
person belongs,”42 meant that “the relationship between a State and its
citizens and residents was no longer regarded as being a matter in the
sole prerogative of each State.”43 The UDHR was merely hortatory, but
its adoption led to the rapid proliferation of international and regional
human-rights conventions whose prohibitive rules were binding on the
states that ratiﬁed them, such as the European Convention on Human
Rights (1953),44 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966),45 the American Convention on Human Rights (1969),46 and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1984).47 Those conventions not only include
provisions that govern the use of lethal force and detention, there is
also – at least now, following the ICJ’s decision in the Nuclear Weapons
case48 – no question that they continue to apply during armed conﬂict.49
40 Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The “War on Terror” and International Law in the
United States, 39 Cal. West. J. Int’l L. 101 (2008).
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217
(III) (December 10, 1948).
42 Id., art. 2. 43 Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 29, at 8–9.
44 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 (1953).
45 ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (December 16, 1966).
46 O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
47 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 1987).
48 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8), ¶ 25.
49 See, e.g., Noam Lubell, Challenges of Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conﬂict, 87
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 737, 738 (2005) (“The focus of the arguments is now shifting from
the question of if human rights law applies during armed conﬂict to that of how it applies,
and to the practical problems encountered in its application.”); Kretzmer, Rethinking,
supra note 29, at 17 (noting that it is “quite clear that during an internal armed conﬂict in
a State’s territory that State remains bound by its human rights obligations toward those
in its territory, and subject to its jurisdiction”); Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in
Armed Conﬂict: Does International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 Int’l
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The rise of the “Age of Rights” has led states to rethink their traditional
aversion to regulating NIAC through IHL. Prior to World War II, states
wanted to keep IHL out of NIACs fought on their territory, because the
absence of IHL meant that targeting and detention were regulated solely
by domestic law. Now, however, the choice is not between no inter-
national regulation and regulation by IHL, but between regulation by
IHL and regulation by IHRL. And that is no contest: as discussed in more
detail in Section II, the prohibitive rules of IHRL impose far greater
substantive limits on targeting and detention than the prohibitive rules
of IHL. As a result, states now want to ensure that IHL applies in NIAC
as broadly as possible – in order to keep IHRL out.50
States’ preference for IHL, of course, implicates the much-debated
principle of lex specialis. As Sivakumaran notes, “in the majority of
situations, a particular norm will exist both in international human rights
law as well as in international humanitarian law. In such instances, the
precise relationship between the two norms will have to be ascer-
tained.”51 Three basic versions of lex specialis exist: (1) total displacement,
according to which IHL completely displaces IHRL in situations of
armed conﬂict; (2) partial displacement, which accepts that both IHL
and IHRL apply in armed conﬂict but insists that speciﬁc rules of IHL
displace competing rules of IHRL (understood as rules whose application
would lead to a different substantive result); and (3) principle of norm-
conﬂict resolution, according to which speciﬁc rules of IHL do not “ipso
facto override, displace or qualify conﬂicting norms of IHRL,” but must
always be taken into account when interpreting IHRL norms.52
Rev. Red Cross 881, 886 (2006) (noting that “human rights law does not make a
distinction between armed conﬂict and peace”).
50 See, e.g., Claus Kress, Some Reﬂections on the International Legal Framework Governing
Transnational Armed Conﬂicts, 15 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 245, 260 (2010) (noting that, “in
light of the (perceived) threat posed by violent non-State actors, States seem to be more
interested in availing themselves of the wider powers they can derive from the application
of the law of non-international armed conﬂict (compared with international human rights
law) than they are concerned by the restraining effect of the ensuing obligations”); cf.
Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 29, at 39 (“While the original intention behind extension
of IHL to non-international armed conﬂicts was to enhance the protection granted to
potential victims of such conﬂicts, given the dramatic development of IHRL, categorization
of a situation as one of armed conﬂict, rather than internal unrest, may serve to weaken the
protection offered to potential victims rather than to strengthen it.”).
51 Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 89.
52 Marko Milanovic, The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, this volume, at 24–28.
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It is no longer possible to defend the ﬁrst version of lex specialis, for all
the reasons that Milanovic has identiﬁed – state practice, the derogation
provisions in human-rights conventions like the ECHR, the ICJ’s Nuclear
Weapons opinion, and so on.53 The crux of the debate is thus between the
second and third versions. Most scholars seem to adopt the partial-
displacement view,54 though Milanovic has persuasively defended the
norm-conﬂict-resolution view.55
We do not have to decide which version of lex specialis is correct,
though, because both versions share a common assumption: namely, that
an applicable rule of IHRL can be displaced or modiﬁed only by a
competing rule of IHL. In the absence of a competing rule of IHL – or,
differently put, in the presence of a gap in IHL – both versions of lex
specialis agree that the rule of IHRL applies.
The key here is “competing rule of IHL.” Scholars uniformly assume
that the kind of IHL rule capable of displacing or modifying a competing
rule of IHRL is one that is based on either convention or custom.56 They
53 Id. at 24–25.
54 See, e.g., Doswald-Beck, supra note 49, at 903–04 (“Speciﬁc, clear and well-established
rules of IHL can be considered to be lex specialis.”); Deborah Casalin, Taking Prisoners:
Reviewing the International Humanitarian Law Grounds for Deprivation of Liberty by
Armed Opposition Groups, 93 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 743, 745–46 (2011) (“IHRL still
applies during NIACs to the extent that . . . an IHRL rule has not been superseded by a
more speciﬁc rule of IHL operating as lex specialis.”); Marco Sassoli, The Relationship
Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admis-
sible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conﬂicts, 90 Int’l
Rev. Red Cross 599 (2008) (noting that lex specialis “seeks to establish . . . a preferential
order for two rules that apply to the same problem but regulate it differently”).
55 See generally Milanovic, Lex Specialis, supra note 52.
56 See, e.g., John F. Murphy, Will-o’-the-Wisp? The Search for Law in Non-International
Armed Conﬂicts, 88 Int’l Law Stud. 15, 25 (2012) (noting that IHL should ideally be
extended to NIAC by convention, but accepting that “if this method of extension is a
mission impossible, as the evidence convincingly demonstrates, then customary inter-
national law methodology will have to be employed”); Sean Watts, Present and Future
Conceptions of the Status of Government Forces in Non-International Armed Conﬂict, 88
Int’l Law Stud. 145, 151 (2012) (“[T]he material ﬁeld of application of a number of
important international law-of-war instruments has recently been expanded to NIAC. By
their terms, these treaties formerly regulated only IAC. Previously, their extension to
NIAC could only be achieved by proof of customary status-a technique fraught with
ambiguity and subject to vexing caveat.”); Jens Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis? 11 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 27, 35 (2013) (“The gap-ﬁlling version of the co-application thesis is
particularly relevant with regard to the rules applicable in NIACs which are codiﬁed
only in Common Article 3 and APII, arguably leaving substantial gaps in which IHRL
might be applied. However, if one argues that IAC norms apply by virtue of custom in
NIAC, then the available space for IHRL to ‘ﬁll the gap’ is substantially reduced.”);
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have never suggested that an IHL rule that applies solely by analogy is the
kind of lex capable of representing the lex specialis. On the contrary,
Krieger has speciﬁcally stated that IHL “does not per se override human
rights law in cases where humanitarian law itself is only applied by way of
analogy,”57 while Vöneky has made the more general point that because
“an argument by analogy is valid only if and as far as a lacuna exists,” the
issue in question “must not be covered by any rule of international law or
any general principle of law.”58
The idea that only a rule of international law is capable of displacing a
competing rule of international law via lex specialis explains why the
second Lotus principle does not, in fact, permit a state to apply an IAC-
based rule of IHL to NIAC by analogy. As we have seen, the argument for
analogy depends upon the idea that states have the right to organize their
domestic law as they see ﬁt, subject only to prohibitive rules of inter-
national law – that is what the PCIJ meant in Lotus when it said that,
with reference to a state’s exercise of prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction on its own territory, “[i]n these circumstances all that can
be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which
international law places upon its jurisdiction.”59 It is true that in internal
NIACs there may be no prohibitive rules of IHL that prevent states from
analogizing between IAC and NIAC. But there are prohibitive rules of
IHRL that do so.60 Those rules could be displaced or modiﬁed by rules of
IHL that exist as a matter of convention or custom, but they cannot be
displaced or modiﬁed by permissive or less prohibitive rules of IHL that
exist only as domestic law. A state that insists it can violate prohibitive
William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conﬂict: The European Court
of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 741, 748 (2005) (“There is a broad
consensus that Common Article 3 and Protocol II fail to effectively regulate many aspects
of those conﬂicts, but some lawyers and advocates look to customary international law –
unwritten rules that states consider to be legally binding – to ﬁll the gaps.”).
57 Heike Krieger, A Conﬂict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 265, 273
(2006); see also Crawford, supra note 2, at 453, (“[P]olicy arguments alone are not enough
to make a viable case for the elimination of the distinction between types of armed
conﬂict. Support for the proposition needed to be found in other sources of international
law, namely from state practice and from opinio juris.”).
58 Voneky, supra note 16, at ¶ 16. 59 Lotus, supra note 25, at 19.
60 Interestingly, Goodman acknowledges in a footnote that his argument “relates only to
IHL. The application of other legal regimes – e.g., human rights law – might complicate
this account, especially insofar as those rules impose obligations on the exercise of state
power domestically and not extraterritorially.” Goodman, Detention of Civilians, supra
note 24, at 50 n. 9.
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rules of IHRL because it has relied on analogy to adopt contrary rules of
“domestic humanitarian law” thus precisely “overstep[s] the limits which
international law places upon its jurisdiction.”61
C. Transnational NIAC
Traditional NIACs were generally fought on “the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties,” even if hostilities had a propensity to spill
across state borders. Such NIACs still take place, but transnational
armed conﬂicts – NIACs in which states are engaged in hostilities with
organized armed groups located primarily, if not exclusively, on the
territory of other states62 – have become increasingly common: Israel’s
NIAC with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006; Columbia’s NIAC with
FARC in Ecuador in 2008; Turkey’s ongoing NIAC with the PKK in
Iraq; and, of course, the U.S.’s seemingly endless NIAC with al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. As we will see, the
evolution of transnational NIAC both complicates and strengthens the
case against analogy.
1. IHL and IHRL
The complication involves the relationship between IHL and IHRL. As
long as a NIAC is being fought primarily on a state’s own territory, there
is no question that the hostilities are governed by both legal regimes (via
lex specialis, however interpreted); IHRL’s application is primarily terri-
torial.63 But what about transnational NIACs? Are they governed solely
by IHL or by both IHL and IHRL?
Answering that question, of course, requires addressing the difﬁcult
and much-debated issue of whether and to what extent IHRL applies
extraterritorially. If IHRL does not apply extraterritorially, states are in
an odd situation: unable to rely on analogy when ﬁghting a NIAC on
their territory (because of the limits IHRL imposes on their domestic
law), but able to rely on analogy when ﬁghting a transnational NIAC
(because their domestic law would not be limited by IHRL.)
61 Lotus, supra note 25, at 19; see also Hugh Handeyside, Note, The Lotus Principle in ICJ
Jurisprudence: Was the Ship Ever Aﬂoat?, 29 Mich. J. Int’l L. 71, 90 (2007) (noting that
the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case “suggested that the only instance in which the Lotus
principle would come into play would be one in which no principles or rules of
international law could be said to restrict the state behavior in question”).
62 See, e.g., Watts, supra note 56, at 155. 63 Cerone, supra note 32, at 416.
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The better view, however, is that IHRL does apply extraterritorially, at
least with regard to the rights at issue in targeting and detention – the right
to life and the right to liberty. A complete examination of that issue is
beyond the scope of this chapter, but three points are worth emphasizing.
First, it seems clear that conventional IHRL applies to extraterritorial
detention – a proposition that Van Schaack has described as “categor-
ical.”64 The Human Rights Committee has consistently taken that pos-
ition, most recently in General Comment 35, which states that because
“arrest and detention bring a person within a state’s effective control,
States partiesmust not arbitrarily or unlawfully arrest or detain individuals
outside their territory.”65 That conclusion is echoed by a long line of cases
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), such as Issa,66
Öcalan,67 and Al-Skeini,68 as well as by the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.69 Even high-ranking USG ofﬁcials –
though not the USG itself – have acknowledged that the right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of liberty applies extraterritorially.70
Second, there is also strong support for the idea that, at a minimum,
prohibitive rules of conventional IHRL – particularly the right to life –
apply extraterritorially. The Human Rights Committee has consistently
suggested as much,71 and according to Van Schaack “[a] longitudinal
review” of the relevant jurisprudence “reveals a distinct trend toward an
understanding that States’ human rights obligations follow their agents
and instrumentalities offshore whenever they are in a position to respect –
or to violate – the rights of individuals they confront abroad.”72 Cerone
has reached a similar conclusion, adding that “the structure of Article 2(1)
64 Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change, 90 Int’l L. Stud. 20, 52 (2014).
65 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of
the Person, CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶ 64 (October 28, 2014) (Advanced Unedited Version).
66 Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567, ¶ 70 (2004).
67 Öcalan v. Turkey, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10, ¶ 93 (2003).
68 Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, 597,
¶ 80 (2011).
69 See, e.g., Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev., ¶ 37 (1999).
70 Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Memorandum Opinion on the
Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 4
(October 19, 2010), available at http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf.
71 See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extrajudicial Executions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 171, 184 (2005).
72 Van Schaack, supra note 64, at 32.
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of the ICCPR supports the notion that negative obligations apply vis-à-vis
all individuals everywhere, whereas positive obligations may have a more
limited scope.”73
Finally, even if the right to life does not apply extraterritorially as a
matter of conventional law, it almost certainly applies extraterritorially as
a matter of custom. As Kretzmer notes, “[w]hile a state party’s treaty
obligations are a function of the scope of application deﬁned in the
particular treaty, some of the substantive norms in human rights treaties
that have been ratiﬁed by the vast majority of states in the world, have
now become peremptory norms of customary international law. The
duty to respect the right to life is surely one of these norms.”74 Many
other scholars – of very different political persuasions – agree.75
Because IHRL’s rights to life and liberty almost certainly apply extra-
territorially, states are no more free to rely on analogy in transnational
NIAC than they are in purely internal NIAC. In both situations, their
freedom to adopt targeting and detention rules as domestic humanitarian
law is limited by the prohibitive rules of IHRL.
2. IHL, the Principle of Non-Intervention, and the
Jus ad Bellum
As long as states fought NIACs on their own territory, IHRL represented
the only possible limitation on their targeting and detention practices.
But once NIACs went transnational, the legal landscape changed
dramatically:
Transnational armed conﬂict greatly strains traditional territorial or pol-
itically based claims of exclusive sovereign prerogative on the part of the
government under attack. Classic, non-extraterritorial NIAC has relied
greatly on traditional notions of territorial sovereignty to fend off
73 Cerone, supra note 32, at 446.
74 Kretzmer, Targeted Killing, supra note 71, at 184–85.
75 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of
International Law, 52 Colum. J. Trans. L. 77, 110 (2013) (“[T]here is nevertheless a
customary international human rights law right to life that applies extraterritorially.”);
Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors 235
(2010) (“Since forcible measures, such as killings and torture, are in fact a subject of
customary international law, extraterritorial measures of this type can amount to a
violation of international human rights obligations, regardless of treaty applicability
and how it is interpreted.”); Cerone, supra note 32, at 436 (noting, with respect to
conventional IHRL, that “this limitation of scope may not apply with respect to those
human rights norms that have evolved into customary international law. Thus, all states
may be bound by these norms in their dealings with anyone anywhere”).
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international regulation. With their cross-border incursions and move-
ments, transnational armed conﬂicts unmoor NIAC from many of its
traditional claims to general freedom from international regulation.76
In particular, the extraterritorial targeting and detention that are regular
aspects of transnational NIAC implicate the ﬁrst Lotus principle, which
says that states cannot exercise enforcement jurisdiction on the territory
of another state unless a permissive rule of international law allows them
to do so:
The ﬁrst and foremost restriction imposed by international law on a State
is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention.
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may
not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts
to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this
respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases
by prohibitive rules.77
All transnational NIACs have to confront the ﬁrst Lotus principle – but its
implications are particularly acute for the U.S.’s transnational NIAC with
al-Qaeda, in which the USG is applying a variety of permissive IAC-based
rules of IHL by analogy. At the domestic level, the U.S.’s right to use force
against al-Qaeda is governed by the AUMF, which provides, in relevant
part, that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001.”78 As discussed in more detail in Section
II, by analogizing between IAC and NIAC, the USG has greatly expanded
the number of persons against whom it is entitled to use force extraterri-
torially under the AUMF – it can target al-Qaeda’s “associated forces” as
well as Al-Qaeda itself because of the analogy to co-belligerency; it can
detain individuals who “substantially support” either because of the ana-
logy to “persons accompanying” in GC III; and so on. More importantly,
the U.S. has almost certainly actually usedmore extraterritorial force in its
transnational NIAC with al-Qaeda than it would have in the absence of
76 Watts, supra note 56, at 156. 77 Lotus, supra note 25, at ¶¶ 45, 46.
78 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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analogy. It is reasonable to assume, for example, that the drone program
in Somalia would look very different if the USG could not use
co-belligerency to connect al-Shabaab to al-Qaeda.
Each time it relies on the AUMF to extraterritorially target or detain a
member of “al-Qaeda and its associated forces,” however, the U.S. must
avoid violating the ﬁrst Lotus principle. Simply put, extraterritorial
targeting and detention are each potentially limited by two different
prohibitive rules of international law79: the prohibition on the use of
force in Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter; and the principle of non-
intervention, “the obligation of states to refrain from performing juris-
dictional acts within the territory of other states except by virtue of
general or special permission.”80 Any act that violates the prohibition
on the use of force will violate the principle of non-intervention,81 but
not all acts that violate the principle of non-intervention will violate the
prohibition on the use of force – the principle of non-intervention
applies to extraterritorial material acts of enforcement jurisdiction gen-
erally, while the prohibition on the use of force applies only to those
extraterritorial material acts that involve the “threat or use of force.”82
It is uncontroversial that extraterritorial targeting qualiﬁes as a “use of
force” for purposes of Art. 2(4); that is the position of both the U.N.83
and most scholars.84 The U.S. has also acknowledged that the jus ad
bellum applies to its targeted killings – it has always defended them by
79 The ICJ made clear in the Nicaragua case that although there is substantial overlap
between the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention, they
are different prohibitive rules under customary international law. See Military and
Paramilitary (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), ¶ 185.
80 Elihu Lauterpacht, I International Law 487–88 (1970); see also Nicaragua, supra
note 79, at ¶ 202 (“The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every State to
conduct its affairs without outside interference.”).
81 Michael C. Bonafede, Note, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality
Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks,
88 Cornell L. Rev. 155, 169 (2002).
82 Nicaragua, supra note 79, at ¶ 202.
83 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip
Alston, at ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, (May 28, 2010) (“Targeted killings con-
ducted in the territory of other States raise sovereignty concerns. Under Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, States are forbidden from using force in the territory of another State.”).
84 See Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law 51 (2008) (“Authors
generally agree that, in principle, the resort by a State to targeted killings within another
State falls under the prohibition on interstate force expressed in Article 2(4) U.N.
Charter”); see also Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad
Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 Am
J. Int’l L. 159, 209 (2014) (“[A] deliberate projection of lethal force onto the territory of
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invoking self-defense under Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter, and that right
exists only in relation to acts that violate Art. 2(4).85 An unjustiﬁed act of
extraterritorial targeting thus violates both the jus ad bellum and the
principle of non-intervention.
There is some controversy, by contrast, over extraterritorial detention.
The general view is that a capture operation on another state’s territory
qualiﬁes as a use of force under Art. 2(4),86 and the U.S. has speciﬁcally
invoked self-defense when asked to provide a legal justiﬁcation for such
operations – most recently with regard to the capture of Ahmed Abu
Khattalah in Libya.87 Nevertheless, some scholars continue to insist that
such operations are the kind of “[m]inimal or de minimis uses of force
[that] fall below the threshold of the Article 2(4) prohibition.”88 The
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conﬂict in Geor-
gia has taken the same position.89 That dispute is inconsequential here,
however, because all scholars agree that, at a minimum, extraterritorial
capture and detention can violate the principle of non-intervention.90
another state – even if small-scale and even if not targeting the state itself – will normally
trigger Article 2(4).”).
85 See, e.g., Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed
Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or an Associated
Force, at 3 (Undated), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (“Any operation of the sort addressed here would be
conducted in a foreign country against a senior operational leader of al-Qaida or its
associated forces who poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.
A use of force in such circumstances would be justiﬁed as an act of national self-defence.”).
86 See Dan E. Stigall, Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the Prohibition on
Extraterritorial Enforcement Jurisdiction in International Law, 3 Notre Dame J. Int’l
L 1, 18 (2013) (“With regard to an extraterritorial arrest, such action is considered to be a
use of force in the territory of another sovereign and is tantamount to abduction.”); see
also Ruys, Use of Force, supra note 84, at 197.
87 Letter from Samantha Powers to Vitaly Churkin, President of the United Nations
Security Council (June 17, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-
resolution-article-51-letters-force-syria-isil-khorasan-group/ (claiming that those actions
“were taken in accordance with the United States’ inherent right of self-defense”); see also
Abraham Sofaer, Irregular Apprehension of Criminal Suspects, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 725, 727
(1990) (“Arrests in foreign states without their consent have no legal justiﬁcation under
international law aside from self-defense.”).
88 Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Prohibition on the Use of Force, in Research Handbook
on International Conﬂict and Security Law 89, 102 (Nigel White & Christian Henderson
eds., 2013).
89 See 2 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the
Conflict in Georgia 242 n. 49 (2009).
90 See, e.g., Elihu Lauterpacht, supra note 80, at 488 (noting that the principle prohibits
“the sending of agents for the purpose of apprehending within foreign territory persons
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Extraterritorial targeting and detention thus each potentially violate
at least one prohibitive rule of international law: targeting potentially
violates both the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-
intervention; detention potentially violates either the prohibition on the use
of force or the principle of non-intervention. That does not mean that the
extraterritorial targeting and capture conducted pursuant to analogized
rules of IHL is necessarily unlawful. But it does mean that the U.S. is not
free to engage in such targeting and detention as it sees ﬁt. On the contrary,
the U.S. must a ﬁnd a permissive rule of international law that legitimizes
its analogy-based extraterritorial targeting and detention; as the PCIJ said
in Lotus, “theﬁrst and foremost restriction imposed by international law on
a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”
Two such permissive rules, of course, immediately suggest themselves.
The ﬁrst is consent: extraterritorial targeting and detention do not violate
either the prohibition on the use of force or the principle of non-
intervention when a state is acting with the consent of the territorial
state.91 Such situations are not uncommon, but they are clearly not the
norm. The U.S. is thus more likely – as indicated by past practice – to
invoke the second permissive rule: self-defense. Self-defense under
Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter is a prototypic exception to the prohibition
on the use of force, and the ICJ suggested in the Nicaragua case that self-
defense can also justify breaches of the principle of non-intervention.92
A use of force must satisfy three requirements in order to qualify as
self-defense. The ﬁrst two are well-known, if under-studied: necessity and
proportionality.93 As Section II discusses in detail, because many acts of
accused of having committed a crime”); Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1071, 1082 (2006)
(noting that the principle “would clearly cover unauthorized entry into territory” and
“unauthorized use of territory, such as Italian claims that CIA agents abducted an
Egyptian cleric in Milan in February 2003”); Int’l Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task
Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 10 (2009) (“[A] state cannot investigate a
crime, arrest a suspect, or enforce its judgment or judicial processes in another state’s
territory without the latter state’s permission.”).
91 See, e.g., Alston Report, supra note 83, at ¶ 35; Melzer, supra note 84, at 51.
92 Nicaragua, supra note 79, at ¶ 210; see also Sofaer, supra note 87, at 727 (“[I]nternational
law . . . permits extraterritorial “arrests” in situations which permit a valid claim of
self-defense.”).
93 See Tom Ruys, “Armed Attack” and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter 94 (2010)
(“Notwithstanding the broad consensus as to their limiting role, the necessity and
proportionality criteria have generated relatively little (in-depth) academic interest.”).
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analogy-justiﬁed extraterritorial targeting and detention will violate the
proportionality requirement, the U.S.’s application of those rules in
transnational NIAC is problematic.
The third requirement of self-defense is of particular relevance to the
legitimacy of applying IAC-based rules of IHL to NIAC by analogy: self-
defensive acts must comply with IHL in order to be lawful under the jus ad
bellum. This requirement is generally ignored in contemporary debates
about self-defense under Art. 51, but it was speciﬁcally afﬁrmed by the
ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case:
[A] use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defence, must,
in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in
armed conﬂict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law.94
The ICJ’s conclusion does not simply re-state the uncontroversial idea
that compliance with the jus ad bellum does not free an attacker from the
need to comply with IHL. What it means is that – as Christopher
Greenwood has noted – an extraterritorial use of force that does not
comply with IHL violates both the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum:
[T]he logical justiﬁcation for holding that a state which is entitled to use
force must comply with the jus in bello lies in considerations of the jus ad
bellum, namely that an act which contravened the jus in bello could not be
a reasonable and proportionate measure of self-defence. In that sense, the
rules of the jus in bello give detailed expression to one of the principles of
the jus ad bellum.95
94 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 48, at ¶ 42.
95 Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, 9 Rev.
Int’l Stud. 221, 231 (1983); see also Andreas Zimmerman, The Second Lebanon War: Jus
ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and the Issue of Proportionality, 11 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 99,
124 (2007) (“[A] further prerequisite relates to the fact that measures taken under Article
51 of the Charter must be also legal for purposes of jus ad bellum, i.e., must abide by
applicable rules of international humanitarian law. This inter-linkage between jus ad
bellum and jus in bello was unequivocally conﬁrmed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion
concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”); Eyal Benvenisti,
Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate
Actors, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 541, 542 n. 6 (2009) (“Although the jus ad bellum assessment
does not depend on jus in bello considerations, a response to aggression that harms
noncombatants excessively would be regarded itself as a jus ad bellum violation.”);
Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States
168–69 (2004) (“From time to time, there have been suggestions that issues such as the
means and methods of warfare adopted by a State in the exercise of its right of self-
defence are purely in the province of IHL. . . . However, the requirements of
proportionality in its jus ad bellum sense must also be met.”). This is also clear from
252 conceptual limits of the law of war framework
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316481103.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 13:06:50, subject to the Cambridge Core
This requirement creates a serious problem for the use of analogy. As we
have seen, rules of IHL that are applied in NIAC by analogy to IAC do not
represent international law; they have no basis in convention or custom.
Those rules are simply domestic law, their application ostensibly justiﬁed
by NIAC’s relative lack of prohibitive conventional and customary IHL
rules. But the jus ad bellum (and thus presumably the principle of non-
intervention) requires compliance with international humanitarian law –
the conventional or customary laws of war. Nothing in the Nuclear
Weapons opinion or in the writings of scholars like Greenwood suggests
that a use of force satisﬁes the jus ad bellum as long as it complies with the
domestic humanitarian law of the attacking state. And indeed, that idea
seems fundamentally at odds with the assumption underlying the IHL-
compliance requirement: namely, that a state is only entitled to use force
extraterritorially when its actions are consistent with all of the prohibitive
rules of international law, from the jus ad bellum to the jus in bello.
To be fair, it might be argued – drawing on Goodman’s work – that as
long as an analogized rule does not violate a speciﬁc prohibitive conven-
tional or customary rule of IHL that applies in NIAC, extraterritorial
targeting or detention conducted pursuant to that rule cannot be con-
sidered “inconsistent” with IHL. Such an argument, however, seems to
rely on a counterintuitive understanding of consistency. As long as an
analogized rule allows for the targeting or detention of individuals who
could not be targeted or detained under conventional and customary
rules of IHL, such targeting and detention cannot be considered consist-
ent with – cannot “meet the requirements of” – IHL. In other words,
using analogy to expand the reach of IHL in NIAC beyond conventional
or customary law is a form of inconsistency.
That said, the response does highlight an unresolved issue in the jus ad
bellum. The Nuclear Weapons case focused on armed conﬂict; it did not
address a situation in which a state uses the kind of force that triggers the
jus ad bellum during peacetime. Presumably, in such situations, the jus
ad bellum requires the use of force not only to be necessary and propor-
tionate, but also to comply with the applicable rules of IHRL. Assume, for
example, that an act of self-defense involving targeted killing would be
the context of paragraph 42 in the Nicaragua judgment. Paragraph 40 introduced the
following paragraphs by stating that “[t]he entitlement to resort to self-defence under
Article 51 is subject to certain constraints. Some of these constraints are inherent in the
very concept of self-defence. Other requirements are speciﬁed in Article 51.” Nicaragua,
supra note 79, at ¶ 40.
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“arbitrary” under either IHL or IHRL. If that act would violate the jus ad
bellum in an armed conﬂict, it would surely also violate the jus ad bellum
in peacetime.
II. Speciﬁc Analogies
From an international law perspective, in short, the U.S. practice of
applying IAC-based rules of IHL to NIAC by analogy is very difﬁcult to
justify. Because those analogized rules represent domestic law, not inter-
national law, Lotus permits the U.S. to apply them only insofar as they do
not run afoul of a prohibitive rule of international law. With the rise of
human rights and the evolution of transnational NIAC, however, a
number of prohibitive rules now potentially limit the use of analogy in
the context of targeting and detention: the rules of IHRL, which apply to all
NIACs, as well as the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition on
the use of force, which apply in transnational armed conﬂict. Insofar as an
analogized rule results in targeting or detention that violates one or more
of those prohibitive rules, therefore, the U.S. is violating international law.
This section now turns to speciﬁc analogies between IAC and NIAC –
most applied by the U.S., but one defended by scholars who believe that
analogy to IAC permits organized armed groups to detain individuals
in NIAC. As we will see, because none of the analogies have a basis in
conventional or customary international law, they all violate the prohibi-
tive rules of IHRL, the prohibitive rules governing extraterritorial targeting
and detention, or both.
A. “Ongoing” Self-Defense
In a speech at Harvard in 2011, John Brennan, then the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, claimed that because the U.S. was
engaged in an armed conﬂict with al-Qaeda, the USG “takes the legal
position that – in accordance with international law – we have the
authority to take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces with-
out doing a separate self-defense analysis each time.”96 According to
Brennan, in other words, the requirements of self-defense under
96 John O. Brennan, Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws, Speech at
Harvard University (September 16, 2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/
2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.
254 conceptual limits of the law of war framework
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316481103.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 13:06:50, subject to the Cambridge Core
Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter – necessity, proportionality, and compliance
with IHL – applied only to the U.S.’s initial act of self-defense against al-
Qaeda; because its response (arguably) complied with those require-
ments, its subsequent acts of targeting and detention against “al-Qaeda
and its associated forces” were and are subject solely to IHL.
Brennan cited only “international law” for this position, which we
might call “ongoing” self-defense, but it appears to be based on analogy
to a particular understanding of self-defense in IAC that has been
articulated by Dinstein, Ago, and Kunz. Dinstein argues that “[t]here is
no support in the practice of States for the notion that proportionality
remains relevant – and has to be constantly assessed – throughout the
hostilities in the course of war. Once war is raging, the exercise of self-
defence may bring about ‘the destruction of the enemy’s army’, regardless
of the condition of proportionality.”97 Similarly, Ago wrote – in his
capacity as the ILC’s Special Rapporteur for State Responsibility – that
“[t]he limits inherent in the requirement of proportionality are clearly
meaningless where the armed attack and the likewise armed resistance to
it lead to a state of war between two countries.”98 And Kunz took the
position that self-defense is not limited to repelling an armed attack, but
“seems to give the state or states exercising the right of individual or
collective self-defense the right to resort to a justiﬁed war, to carry this
war to victory, to impose a peace treaty upon the vanquished
aggressor.”99
It is easy to see why the U.S. would want to analogize this IAC-based
understanding of self-defense to its NIAC with al-Qaeda: it insulates the
U.S. from the claim that although it was clearly entitled to act in self-
defense in response to al-Qaeda’s initial armed attack – especially an
attack of the magnitude of 9/11 – its subsequent actions have exceeded
the limits of proportionality. Differently put, “ongoing” self-defense
permits the U.S. to completely destroy al-Qaeda and its associated
forces – to “carry this war to victory” – even if a less ambitious warﬁght-
ing strategy would completely neutralize the threat of armed attack posed
by those groups.
Ongoing self-defense might have represented positive international
law prior to World War II – the type of large-scale war that Dinstein,
97 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense 237 (4th ed. 2005).
98 Robert Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] II ILC Y.B. 13, 70.
99 Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 872, 876–77 (1947).
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Ago, andKunzwere addressing.100 Post-Charter practice, however, indicates
that the doctrine no longer applies even in IAC. Ruys notes, for example, that
although the international community might have been prepared to accept
that theU.S. acted in self-defensewhen it invaded theDominicanRepublic in
1965 to protect its citizens, many states unequivocally condemned the U.S.’s
later decision to overthrow the left-wing regime because they believed regime
change was disproportionate to that goal.101 Similarly, Gardam points out
that even if states accepted the idea that the U.S. invasion of Panama in
1989 was a legitimate act of self-defense, they did not believe that protecting
American nationals justiﬁed removing General Noriega from power.102
Indeed, the idea of ongoing self-defense is generally inconsistent with state
practice that insists self-defense must be temporally limited – a
proportionality factor that by deﬁnition must be assessed in media res.103
It is also worth noting that Dinstein, Ago, and Kunz are very much in
the minority concerning ongoing self-defense. Most scholars believe that
each and every use of force during an armed conﬂict is subject to the
same self-defense requirements as a state’s initial response to an armed
attack.104 Greenwood’s position is typical:
This requirement of proportionality . . . means that it is not enough for
a state to show that its initial recourse to force was a justiﬁable act of
self-defence and that its subsequent acts have complied with the jus in
bello. It must also show that all its measures involving the use of force,
100 Dinstein speciﬁcally cites World War II as an example, Dinstein, supra note 97, at 240,
and Kunz was writing in 1947.
101 See Ruys, supra note 93, at 117. 102 Gardam, supra note 95, at 166–67.
103 See Ruys, supra note 93, at 119–20.
104 See also Id. at 123–24 (“There exists no neat separation between the two, in the sense that
necessity would determine when defensive action would be permissible, whereas
proportionality would be the standard to evaluate what could be done in self-defence:
to the contrary, both standards must constantly be kept under review and overlap to a
certain degree.”); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conﬂation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus
ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 47, 68
(2009) (“Even more generally, the jus ad bellum now applies not only to the initial
decision to resort to force but also to all conduct ‘involving the use of force which occurs
during the course of hostilities’. That conduct must be necessary and proportionate to
the casus belli.”) (citation omitted); Gardam, supra note 95, at 156 (“Proportionality,
moreover, remains relevant throughout a conﬂict. A State cannot assess proportionality
at the time of making the decision as to the appropriate response to an armed attack and
then dispense with it.”); David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and
Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 235, 267–68 (2013) (“War aims
may have to be redeﬁned and consideration given to the necessity of using further force
as well as caused by pursuing those aims. Hence, examining the proportionality of the
force may become an ongoing process.”).
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throughout the conﬂict, are reasonable, proportionate acts of self-defence.
Once its response ceases to be reasonably proportionate then it is itself
guilty of a violation of the jus ad bellum. The fact that the modern jus ad
bellum thus applies during a conﬂict has important legal consequences. It
means that an attack carried out in the middle of a conﬂict upon what is,
in terms of the jus in bello, a legitimate military target by methods which
are not forbidden by the jus in bello will nevertheless be a violation of
international law if it cannot be justiﬁed by reference to the principle
of self-defence.105
It is unclear whether Ago and Kunz would disagree in the context of
NIAC; both wrote long before NIAC went transnational. (Kunz wrote in
1947; Ago in 1980.) Dinstein, however, would almost certainly be skeptical
of analogizing between IAC and NIAC in the context of ongoing
self-defense: he speciﬁcally distinguishes between a “war of self-defense”
and self-defense that responds to an “isolated armed attack” of the
kind that normally triggers a transnational NIAC, suggesting that
proportionality remains relevant during self-defense of the latter type.106
More importantly, though, state practice simply does not support the
U.S. claim that ongoing self-defense applies in NIAC, as the international
response to the 2006 NIAC in Lebanon fought by Israel and Hezbollah
demonstrates. Initially, many states – ranging from Denmark to Japan to
Tanzania – supported Israel’s right to use force against Hezbollah in
self-defense.107 As the NIAC dragged on and Lebanese civilian casualties
continued to mount, though, more and more states claimed that Israel’s
actions had become disproportionate – including states such as France
and Argentina, which had supported Israel at the outbreak of the
conﬂict.108
In short, and pace Brennan’s Harvard speech, state practice in both
IAC and NIAC indicate that, as most scholars believe, ongoing
self-defense has no relevance in any kind of armed conﬂict.
105 Greenwood, Relationship, supra note 95, at 223. It is worth noting Greenwood acknow-
ledges that, in practice, the continuing applicability of the jus ad bellum would not mean
much in the context of an existential conﬂict such as World War II. Id.; see also Ruys,
supra note 93, at 117 (“In extreme cases (for instance, if one State were to commence an
all-out war against another), this would even warrant the defending State pursuing a
total military defeat of the attacking State or the removal of its regime.”).
106 Dinstein, supra note 97, at 238.
107 Christine Gray, The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the
USA, 5 Chinese J. Int’l L. 555, 573 (2006).
108 Id. at 575.
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B. Declarations of War
This U.S. analogy is its most ambitious: relying on “declarations of war”
by organized armed groups to establish the existence of a NIAC. Specif-
ically, the U.S. has consistently argued in the al-Nashiri and al-Qosi cases
that its NIAC with al-Qaeda began when Osama bin Laden declared war
on the U.S. in 1996. Here, for example, is how the USG replied to the al-
Qosi’s argument that no NIAC existed because the U.S. did not consider
itself at war with al-Qaeda prior to 9/11:
While the events of September 11, 2001, no doubt constitute an act of
war, that day was not the start of the armed conﬂict with al Qaeda.
Rather, the United States has been engaged in a [non]international
armed conﬂict with al Qaeda since at least the mid-1990s. Indeed, al
Qaeda declared war on the United States in 1996. Importantly, a state of
armed conﬂict exists even if one party does not recognize a state of war.
Geneva Convention I, Article II (1949). Here, al Qaeda has organized,
planned, and carried out attacks against United States as well as its
citizens, diplomats, and military personnel around the world, consistent
with its 1996 declaration of war.109
The USG’s reliance on bin Laden’s declaration of war in al-Qosi is clearly
based on analogy to IAC, as the citation to the First Geneva Convention
(GC I) indicates. Similarly, the USG has defended its position by noting
that “[t]he Law of War applies to all cases of declared war or any other
armed conﬂicts that arise between the U.S. and other nations, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them”110 – an explicit
reference to IAC.111
It is not surprising that the U.S. wants to analogize between IAC and
NIAC with regard to the beginning of armed conﬂict. Relying on bin
Laden’s declaration of war has three distinct advantages. First, by tem-
porally expanding the NIAC between the U.S. and al-Qaeda, it ensures
that more targeting and detention are governed by the rules of IHL
instead of by IHRL’s much more restrictive rules. The U.S. may not
109 U.S. v. Al-Qosi, Government Response to Defense Motion to Dismiss the Charges for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction to the Extent They Related to the Period Prior to
11 September 2001, D-013, at 1 (November 7, 2008). At least one American scholar has
taken the same position. See Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the
War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 Tex. Int’l L. J. 1, 57 (2011).
110 International and Operational Law Department The Judge Advocate General’s Legal
Center and School, The Operational Law Handbook 15 (2007).
111 Al-Qosi, Government Response, supra note 109, at 1.
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accept that IHRL applies extraterritorially, but it is keenly aware that its
allies, particularly in Europe, do not share its position.112 It thus has a
political interest, if not a legal one (according to its understanding of
IHRL), in bringing as many acts of targeting and detention as possible
within the rubric of IHL. Second, and relatedly, because IHL’s rules
concerning targeting and detention are far less restrictive than IHRL’s
rules, expanding the temporal limits of the U.S./al-Qaeda NIAC makes it
easier for the U.S. to satisfy the ﬁnal requirement of the jus ad bellum
discussed earlier: demonstrating that its extraterritorial uses of force
comply with the applicable rules of IHL or IHRL. Third, the U.S. must
expand the temporal limits of its NIAC with al-Qaeda in order to
prosecute al-Qosi and al-Nashiri in military commissions, because those
commissions only have jurisdiction over acts committed during armed
conﬂict.113
There is, however, no conventional or customary basis for determining
the existence of NIAC by reference to “declarations of war” by an
organized armed group.114 Neither CA3 nor AP II deﬁnes NIAC, and
there is widespread agreement – among scholars115 and by the Inter-
national Law Association116– that the ICTY’s deﬁnition of NIAC in
Tadić117 reﬂects customary international law. Under Tadić, declarations
of war are irrelevant; whether a NIAC exists is determined solely by
reference to the organization of the parties and the intensity of the
hostilities.118 That is a purely objective test – a party’s intent, whether
112 Koh, Memorandum Opinion, supra note 70, at 2–3.
113 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 639 (2006).
114 For that matter, there is no longer a basis in convention or custom for determining the
existence of IAC by reference to declarations of war. See International LawAssociation, Final
Report on the Meaning of Armed Conﬂict in International Law, at 33 (2010), available
at www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/2176DC63-D268-4133–8989A664754F9F87 (“The
earlier practice of states creating a de jure state of war by a declaration is no longer recognized
in international law.”).
115 Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 155 (noting that the Tadić deﬁnition “has since been
adopted by a variety of inﬂuential actors and is widely recognized as authoritative. It
deﬁnes the notion of an armed conﬂict for the purposes of Article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 as well as the notion of a non-international armed conﬂict
in customary international law”).
116 Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conﬂict, supra note 114, at 3. The ILA reached
that conclusion based on an exhaustive multi-year study of the armed conﬂicts that took
place between 1945 and 2010. Id. at 2.
117 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (October 2, 1995).
118 Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conﬂict, supra note 114, at 28–29.
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to afﬁrm or deny the existence of NIAC, has no bearing on whether the
requisite organization and intensity of hostilities exist.119
C. Targeting
The “cardinal rule” of targeting in IHL is the principle of distinction.120
That principle, which applies in both IAC and NIAC,121 is articulated
most clearly in Art. 51(2) of AP I: “[t]he civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”122 In IAC,
anyone who is neither a member of a party’s armed forces nor a
participant in a levée en masse is a civilian.123 In NIAC, a civilian is
anyone who is neither a member of the State’s armed forces nor a
member of an organized armed group.124 As long as they are not hors
de combat, members of the armed forces and members of organized
armed groups can be targeted at any time125 – even when they are not
ﬁghting.126 Civilians, by contrast, are targetable only if they directly
participate in hostilities (DPH), and they can only be targeted “for such
time as” they are participating.127 It is always permissible to use lethal
119 Id. at 33. It is worth noting that scholars recognized that declarations of war by
organized armed groups were irrelevant to the existence of armed conﬂict long before
the ICTY decided Tadić. In 1932, Quincy Wright noted that insurgents, “not being
recognized states, have no power to convert a state of peace into a state of war, so their
declaration or recognition of war would have no legal effect.” Quincy Wright, When
Does War Exist?, 26 Am. J. Int’l L. 362, 366 (1932). Similarly, Lothar Kotzsch noted in
1956 that “any declaration of war on the part of the seditious party is bare of any
relevance in international law,” because “[m]aterial war” is determined “by facts alone.”
Lothar Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History and Inter-
national Law 231 (1956). In other words, even when declarations of war had legal
effect, they mattered only insofar as they were made by states.
120 Geoffrey Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information
Component, 77 Brooklyn L. Rev. 437, 441 (2011–2012).
121 Customary IHL Study, supra note 4, at 3.
122 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conﬂicts, Art. 51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
UNTS 3.
123 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities Under International Humanitarian Law 20 (2009).
124 Id. at 27.
125 Yves Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 § 2195 (1987).
126 See, e.g., Chris Jenks et al., The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational
Approach 165 (2012).
127 AP II, supra note 3, Art. 13(3).
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force against a lawful target; there is no obligation to capture or minimize
the use of force in IHL.128
Under IHRL, by contrast, the cardinal rule of targeting is that an
individual must not be arbitrarily deprived of his right to life.129 Killing
is not arbitrary as long as the use of lethal force is proportionate and
necessary.130 The proportionality requirement limits the degree of force
that a state may use in a particular situation. As summarized by Philip
Alston, “the criterion of proportionality between the force used and the
legitimate objective for which it is used requires that the escalation of
force be broken off when the consequences for the suspect of applying a
higher level of force would ‘outweigh’ the value of the objective.”131
A state may use lethal force against a suspect, therefore, only when he
poses a threat to the lives of others.132 The necessity requirement, in turn,
“imposes an obligation to minimize the level of force applied regardless
of the level of force that would be proportionate.”133 If a suspect who
poses a threat to life can be apprehended or deterred through non-lethal
means, using lethal force against him cannot be considered necessary.134
In practice, the necessity requirement means that the extraterritorial use
of lethal force is justiﬁed only to prevent an imminent attack. Requiring
imminence not only ensures that lethal force will be used only against
suspects who genuinely intend to launch an attack, it also limits the use
of lethal force to situations in which it is genuinely impossible to appre-
hend or deter the suspect.135
It is clearly more difﬁcult to justify targeting under IHRL than under
IHL136: IHRL rejects targeting based on status, strictly limits how much
128 Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting 79 (2009).
129 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 45, Art. 6. 130 Alston Report, supra note 83, ¶ 32.
131 Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/61/311 (September 5, 2006), ¶ 42.
132 Id.; see also Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Ofﬁcials, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Principle 9 (1990), available at www.unrol.org/doc
.aspx?d=2246.
133 Secretary-General’s Note, supra note 131, ¶ 41.
134 See, e.g., Kretzmer, Targeted Killing, supra note 71, at 179; Michael Ramsden, Targeted
Killings and International Human Rights Law: The Case of Anwar Al-Awlaki, 16 J.
Conflict & Sec. L. 385, 400 (2011).
135 Kretzmer, Targeted Killing, supra note 71, at 182.
136 See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 21
Eur. J. Int’l L. 15, 32 (2010); Marko Milanovic, A Norm Conﬂict Perspective on the
Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, J.
Confl. & Sec. L. 459, 478 (2009); Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed
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force can be used against a suspect, imposes a narrow time-frame on
targeting, and requires capture when possible. Moreover, IHRL requires
states to conduct “an independent and objective inquiry” whenever an
individual is killed, while IHL requires an investigation only when there
is reason to believe a war crime has been committed.137
Given these differences, it is not surprising that the U.S. has tried to
expand the number of individuals who can be targeted in NIAC by
analogizing to IAC. Although IHRL continues to apply during armed
conﬂict, it is generally accepted that targeting is the one area in which
IHL does, in fact, generally function as the lex specialis – either displacing
competing rules of IHL or, as held by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
case,138 providing the test for when a killing in armed conﬂict should be
considered “arbitrary.” The wider the application of IHL in NIAC,
therefore, the easier it is for the U.S. to justify using lethal force against
members of “al-Qaeda and its associated forces.”
1. Membership in Organized Armed Groups
As noted, IHL deﬁnes a “civilian” in NIAC negatively, as someone who is
neither amember of the state’s armed forces nor amember of an organized
armed group. The distinction is critical, because non-civilians – normally
referred to as combatants, even though that term does not appear in CA3
or AP II – may be attacked at any time, whereas civilians may only be
targeted “for such time as” they directly participate in hostilities.
There is little controversy over who qualiﬁes as a member of the State’s
armed forces in NIAC: “membership” is generally139 a formal criterion
determined by domestic law.140 It is much less clear, however, who
should be considered a member of an organized armed group, because
AP II does not provide a deﬁnition of membership. The ICRC takes a
functional approach to that question, according to which “the decisive
Conﬂicts and Situations of Occupation, University Centre for International Humanitar-
ian Law, Geneva, at 8 (September 1–2, 2005), available at www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/
expert-meetings/2005/3rapport_droit_vie.pdf.
137 Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 29, at 26; Doswald-Beck, supra note 49, at 887.
138 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 48, at ¶ 25.
139 AP II includes functional criteria as well. As the ICRC Commentary notes, AP II refers
to “armed forces” instead of to “regular armed forces” because the drafters wanted to
include armed forces “not included in the deﬁnition of the army in national legislation of
some countries,” such as “national guard, customs, police forces, or any other similar
force.” Commentary on the Additional Protocols, supra note 125, § 4462.
140 See Melzer, supra note 84, at 844–45.
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criterion for individual membership in an organized armed group is
whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving
his or her direct participation in hostilities.”141 The ICRC thus excludes
from membership – and thus from ongoing targetability – a variety of
individuals “who continuously accompany or support an organized
armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation
in hostilities,”142 most notably those who “assume exclusively political,
administrative or other non-combat functions” in the group143 or assume
“support functions” such as recruitment, training, ﬁnancing, and propa-
gandizing.144 According to the ICRC, the “continuous combat function”
(CCF) deﬁnition of membership reﬂects customary international law.145
The U.S., by contrast, targets and detains on the basis of a much broader
deﬁnition of membership in an organized armed group. Speciﬁcally, as
Judge Walton acknowledged (with approval) in Gherebi, the USG takes
the position that membership in an organized armed group should be
determined by analogy to the deﬁnition of membership in a state’s armed
forces in IAC – thus relying on both formal and functional criteria:
As for the criteria used to determine membership in the “armed forces” of
the enemy, the Court agrees with the government that the criteria set forth
in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention and Article 43 of Additional
Protocol I should inform the Court’s assessment as to whether an individual
qualiﬁes as a member of the “armed forces” of an enemy organization like
al-Qaeda. Although these provisions obviously cannot be applied literally to
the enemy organizations contemplated in the AUMF – if that were the case,
the conﬂict at handwould not be governed by CommonArticle 3 in the ﬁrst
place – they may nevertheless serve as templates from which the Court can
glean certain characteristics necessary to identify those individuals who
comprise an “armed force” for purposes of Common Article 3.146
141 DPH Study, supra note 123, at 33. 142 Id. at 34. 143 Id. 144 Id.
145 See Id. at 73 (“Under customary and treaty IHL . . . persons assuming a continuous
combat function for an organized armed group belonging to a party to the conﬂict, lose
their entitlement to protection against direct attack.”).
146 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Respondents’
Memorandum, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing that “standing U.S. jurisprudence, as well as
law-of-war principles, recognize that members of enemy forces can be detained even if
they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or
entered the theatre or zone of active military operations.”); Harold H. Koh, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Speech to theAmerican Society of International Law
(March 25, 2010), available atwww.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (arguing that
membership “includes, but is not limited to, whether an individual joined with or became
part of al-Qaeda or Taliban forces or associated forces, which can be demonstrated by
relevant evidence of formal or functional membership”).
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This is a distinction with a difference, because the U.S. deﬁnition of
membership brings within IHL’s continuous targeting regime a category
of individuals who could not lawfully be targeted under the ICRC
deﬁnition: namely, anyone who qualiﬁes as a member of an organized
armed group under the U.S.’s dual formal/functional approach but does
not assume a continuous combat function in the group. That is likely a
sizable category, given the variety of “characteristics” the USG and courts
believe qualify an individual as a member of organized armed group by
analogy to GC III and AP I. Harold Koh, for example, publicly claimed
while the State Department’s Legal Adviser that taking an “oath of
loyalty” to al-Qaeda qualiﬁes as membership.147 Similarly, the DC Circuit
has held that an individual can be considered a “facilitator” of al-Qaeda –
and thus “part of” the organization – if he stays at an al-Qaeda guest-
house, travels along a route that leads toward hostilities, and is captured
with a large amount of unexplained cash.148 Needless to say, none of
these actions even qualify as direct participation in hostilities.
It is important to note that, unlike the other analogies discussed in this
chapter, the membership analogy does not use an IAC-based rule of IHL
to ﬁll a gap in the conventional and customary IHL of NIAC. There is a
basis in conventional IHL for the concept of membership in an organized
armed group; the question is simply how membership should be deﬁned.
Deﬁning membership by analogy to state armed forces in IAC should
thus probably be called “soft” analogy.
Nevertheless, the U.S. deﬁnition of membership in an organized armed
group is still problematic. As discussed in Section I, analogized rules of
IHL represent domestic humanitarian law, not international humanitar-
ian law, and thus cannot be applied either territorially or extraterritorially
in the face of contrary prohibitive rules of international law. Here there
are such contrary prohibitive rules: namely, the rules of IHRL governing
the use of lethal force. Those much more limiting IHRL rules can be
displaced or modiﬁed by customary rules of IHL that apply in NIAC –
such as the rule that says a civilian can be targeted for such time as he or
she directly participates in hostilities – but they cannot be displaced or
147 Id.
148 Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2011); cf. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d
400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Being captured in the company of a Taliban ﬁghter and two
al Qaeda members and Osama bin Laden bodyguards 12 miles from Tora Bora in
December 2001 might not be precisely the same as being captured in a German uniform
12 miles from the Normandy beaches in June 1944. But it is still, at a minimum, highly
signiﬁcant.”).
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modiﬁed by an IAC-based rule that is applied to NIAC solely by analogy.
As result, insofar as the U.S. deﬁnition of membership in an organized
armed group goes beyond the customary deﬁnition of membership, the
targeting of individuals who qualify as members under the former deﬁn-
ition but not the latter is governed by IHRL, not by IHL. And there is
little question that IHRL does not permit the use of lethal force at all –
much less the use of force at any time – against individuals who have
sworn loyalty to al-Qaeda or who have “facilitated” terrorism by carrying
cash and staying in al-Qaeda guesthouses.
Numerous scholars, primarily but not exclusively American, have
criticized the ICRC’s “continuous combat function” deﬁnition of mem-
bership.149 Interestingly, though, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a scholar who has
challenged the ICRC’s assertion that the deﬁnition reﬂects customary
international law.150 Instead, criticism has focused almost exclusively
on the fact that the CCF deﬁnition treats state armed forces and organ-
ized armed groups asymmetrically: because non-combat personnel in
NIAC qualify as members of state armed forces but not as members of
organized armed groups, state personnel can be targeted at any time, but
non-state personnel can only be targeted while directly participating.151
Watkin’s criticism of that asymmetry is typical:
The choice made in the Interpretive Guidance to treat organized armed
groups in a completely different fashion than regular State armed forces in
both international and non-international armed conﬂict is novel and
problematic. It does not reﬂect either the nature of warfare or the histor-
ical and contemporary scope of armed conﬂict. In effectively creating a
third category of participant in armed conﬂict, it represents a dramatic
shift from the approach taken by the ICRC to date.152
149 See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC
“Direct Participation in the Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol.
641, 693–95 (2010); Bill Boothby, “And For Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 741, 757 (2010); Michael
N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities:
A Critical Analysis, 1 Harv. Nat. Sec. J. 5, 21–24 (2010); Sivakumaran, supra note 29,
at 361–62,
150 To the contrary, one scholar has noted that, despite the controversy, the continuous
combat function deﬁnition “has substantial support among a wide cross section of
states.” See Jens Ohlin, The Assault on International Law 169–70 (2014).
151 Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 361–62.
152 Watkin, Opportunity Lost, supra note 149, at 693; see also Boothby, supra note 149, at
757 (criticizing CCF for “creat[ing] legal inequality between the opposing parties, thus
eroding the international law assumption that the law applies equally to each party to the
conﬂict”); Schmitt, supra note 149, at 23 (criticizing the fact that, under the CCF test, “a
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This is an unpersuasive criticism. There is no question that conventional
IHL is generally predicated on symmetry, even in NIAC: the rules of CA3
and AP II apply to both state armed forces and organized armed groups
equally.153 From a positivist perspective, though, such symmetry is not
an inherent requirement of IHL; no rule of international law prohibits
states from adopting conventional or customary law that treats states and
organized armed groups differently.154 Indeed, there is at least one
asymmetry between states and organized armed groups in conventional
IHL: the Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conﬂict
(Children in Armed Conﬂict Protocol),155 ratiﬁed by 159 states, requires
organized armed groups to avoid recruiting children under the age of
eighteen, but permits States Parties to recruit children of any age as long
as it is voluntary.156 As long as the ICRC is correct that conventional and
customary IHL dictate the asymmetry between state armed forces and
organized armed groups in terms of membership, therefore, it is difﬁcult
to see how that asymmetry could be legally problematic.157
Moreover, one of the primary critics of the membership asymmetry –
Watkin – has argued that members of the states armed forces are entitled
to the combatant’s privilege, but members of organized armed groups
are not.158 He does not explain why, as a matter of law, asymmetry in
cook in the regular armed forces may be lawfully attacked at any time; his or her
counterpart in an organized armed group may be attacked only if he or she directly
participates and then only for such time as the participation occurs”).
153 Sassoli, Internment, supra note 54, at 602; Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at 303.
154 SeeWatts, supra note 56, at 150 (noting that “no ‘equal application’ principle operates in
the present law of NIAC”); cf. Jonathan Somer, Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the
Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conﬂict, 89 Int’l Rev. Red Cross
655, 659 (2007) (“Yet while the principle [of equality] is undoubtedly established in the
law of international armed conﬂict, there is good reason to question its status in the law
of non-international armed conﬂict.”).
155 A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000. 156 Id., §§ 3(3) & 4(1).
157 It may, of course, be normatively problematic. See, e.g., Sivakumaran, supra note 29, at
361–62.
158 Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and
the Struggle over Legitimacy, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂict
Research, at 65 (2005), available at www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publica
tions/OccasionalPaper2.pdf. But cf. Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, Does
IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conﬂicts?, EJIL:
Talk! (May 17, 2014), available at www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-
detention-in-non-international-armed-conﬂicts/ (“If IHL did indeed provide a legal
basis for killing in a NIAC, it would have to do so on the basis of equality and would
provide a privilege to kill (and a corresponding immunity from prosecution. It does not
do this).”).
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membership is “novel and problematic,” but asymmetry in the combat-
ant’s privilege is completely acceptable. Instead, he simply claims that
extending the combatant’s privilege to members of the state’s armed
forces but not organized armed groups is “logical.”159
By contrast, another scholar who believes the combatant’s privilege
applies asymmetrically in NIAC, Ian Henderson, does try to provide a
legal defense of that asymmetry. Henderson’s argument is straightfor-
ward: state armed forces are entitled to the combatant’s privilege because
states have always insisted that “it is lawful for a government to engage in
a non-international armed conﬂict with a non-state actor,” while organ-
ized armed groups are not entitled to the privilege because states have
equally insisted that “there is no legal right under international law for a
non-state actor to engage in a non-international armed conﬂict.”160 It is
an open question whether Henderson’s view of the combatant’s privilege
is correct; he and Watkin are in the (extreme) minority.161 But his
underlying point is correct: if states want to asymmetrically apply the
combatant’s privilege to NIAC, whether as a matter of convention or
custom, there is nothing stopping them from doing so. Henderson’s
position thus actually supports the idea that nothing in international
law prohibits states from deﬁning membership asymmetrically.
Finally, it is important to note that relying on the membership analogy
makes it very likely the U.S. will engage in extraterritorial targeting that
violates the jus ad bellum. The U.S., of course, takes a maximalist view of
self-defense under Art. 51 –most famously declaring, in its 2002 National
Security Strategy, that it is willing to act “even if uncertainty remains as
to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”162 This endorsement of
preventive self-defense has been widely criticized, both by states163 and
by scholars.164 But even accepting that there is still a great deal of
uncertainty about the current state of self-defense under customary
159 Watkin, Warriors, supra note 158, at 65.
160 Ian Henderson, Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Armed Drones, 13 Y.B. Int’l
Hum. L. 133, 150 (2010).
161 See, e.g., Kretzmer, Rethinking, supra note 29, at 35; Hill-Cawthorne & Akande, supra
note 158; Rona, supra note 40, at 114; Watts, supra note 56, at 149.
162 National Security Strategy of the United States 2002, at 15, available at www.state.gov/
documents/organization/63562.pdf.
163 See Kretzmer, Inherent, supra note 104, at 248 (noting that not even the United
Kingdom, the U.S.’s closest ally, accepts the USG’s view of self-defense).
164 See Ruys, supra note 93, at 322 (noting that “[o]n the whole, legal scholars have almost
unisono denounced the doctrine of preventive self-defence”).
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international law,165 it is clear that the U.S.’s analogical expansion of
membership in an organized armed group beyond the customary CCF
standard is problematic, because it permits the U.S. to extraterritorially
target a variety of individuals who cannot be legitimately attacked under
any conception of self-defense. Assume, for example, that al-Qaeda has
engaged in such a “chain of successive attacks” against the U.S. that the
USG is entitled to use force not just to repel attacks as they happen, but
also to prevent future attacks from taking place.166 In such a situation, it
may well be possible to argue that the U.S. can legitimately use force
against any member of al-Qaeda who assumes a continuous combat
function in the group – the individuals who have taken part in the
previous attacks and will take part in future ones. But it is difﬁcult to
see how self-defense could justify targeting “members” of the group who
do not take part in combat – the cooks, the clerks, etc. Targeting them
would appear to represent precisely the kind of “punitive” attack that is
categorically impermissible under Art. 51.167 Such individuals, however,
are lawful targets in NIAC if membership is deﬁned by analogy to GC III
and AP I.168
2. Co-Belligerency
According to the USG, the AUMF entitles it to use force not only against
al-Qaeda, but also against its “associated forces.”169 To deﬁne the concept
of an “associated force” of al-Qaeda, the USG has consistently analogized
165 See generally Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L.
359–97 (2009) (discussing the contested areas).
166 On the legal issues raised by this type of preventive self-defense, see Id. at 390; Ruys,
supra note 84, at 116; Kretzmer, Inherent, supra note 104, at 271–72.
167 See Kretzmer, Inherent, supra note 104, at 254 (noting that using force “to punish for the
harm done, either out of a feeling of justice or outrage,” is “entirely foreign to self-
defence”).
168 A skeptic might ask why, if this argument is correct, the jus ad bellum doesn’t prohibit
states from targeting cooks and clerks in an IAC. The answer is straightforward: in IAC,
allmembers of a state’s armed forces have the right to participate in hostilities. See Gary
Solis, Law of Armed Conflict 188 (2010). In other words, cooks and clerks can
lawfully participate in armed attacks, even if they usually don’t. They are thus included
in the category of individuals self-defense can justify attacking under the jus ad bellum.
169 See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 85, at 1; Congressional Research Service, Al Qaeda-
Afﬁliated Groups: Middle East and Africa, at 5 (October 10, 2014), available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/233708.pdf (noting that “associated forces are
considered legal targets of U.S. military force per the laws of armed conﬂict”); cf.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, § 1021
(2011) (arguing same with regard to detention).
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to the concept of co-belligerency in IAC – the idea that a “fully ﬂedged
belligerent ﬁghting in association with one or more belligerent
powers”170 is not entitled to invoke the protections of the law of neutral-
ity.171 In a speech at the Oxford Union, Jeh Johnson, then General
Counsel to the Department of Defense (DoD), stated that an “associated
force” is “a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners.”172 In its notorious al-Aulaqi memo, the
Department of Justice (DoJ) approved targeting “a leader of AQAP, an
organized enemy force that is either a component of al-Qaida or that is a
co-belligerent of that central party to the conﬂict.”173 And even more
speciﬁcally, in the Hamlily litigation, the DoJ argued that the AUMF
provides the USG “authority to detain individuals who, in analogous
circumstances in a traditional international armed conﬂict between the
armed forces of opposing governments, would be detainable under
principles of co-belligerency.”174
Scholars have also argued that the concept of “associated forces” should
be deﬁned by analogy to co-belligerency. Bradley and Goldsmith have
argued, for example, that because “[d]ictionary deﬁnitions” of “organiza-
tion” are not useful, “[t]he international law concepts of neutrality and
co-belligerency provide better guidance, and conﬁrm that the ‘enemy’ in
an armed conﬂict can include the enemy’s afﬁliates”:
These principles provide a guide for determining which terrorist organiza-
tions are included within the AUMF. Terrorist organizations that act as
agents of al Qaeda, participate with al Qaeda in acts of war against the
United States, systematically provide military resources to al Qaeda, or
serve as fundamental communication links in the war against the United
States, and perhaps those that systematically permit their buildings and
safehouses to be used by al Qaeda in the war against the United States, are
analogous to co-belligerents in a traditional war. Because the laws of war at
a minimum would deem “neutrals” that systematically violate the laws of
neutrality by supporting or assisting other terrorist organizations to be
lawful military targets, the AUMF should be consistent with its text, with
presidential practice in prior wars, and with standard delegation principles
170 Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 531 (1959).
171 Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conﬂict with Al-Qaeda,
47 Tex. Int’l L. J. 75, 90 (2011).
172 Jeh Johnson Speech, supra note 17. 173 White Paper, supra note 85, at 27.
174 Respondents’ Memorandum, supra note 9, at 7. Although the brief speciﬁcally addressed
detention, not targeting, the USG has never indicated that it believes co-belligerency is
limited to the former power.
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extend to terrorist organizations that are functional co-belligerents of
al Qaeda.175
The appeal of the co-belligerency analogy is evident: like the declaration-
of-war analogy, it ensures that targeting al-Qaeda’s “associated forces” is
governed by the rules of IHL instead of by the far more restrictive rules of
IHRL. In the absence of co-belligerency, the U.S. could avoid IHRL only
by demonstrating that it was involved in a separate NIAC with each and
every associated force it wanted to target, either directly (in terms of
hostilities between the U.S. and that associated force) or with the consent
of a government involved in such a separate NIAC.176 For at least some
terrorist groups outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as al-Shabaab
in Somalia and AQAP in Yemen, that could be difﬁcult.
It is impossible to argue, though, that the concept of co-belligerency
applies in NIAC. Co-belligerency is an aspect of the law of neutrality, as
Bradley and Goldsmith openly acknowledge, and there is widespread
scholarly agreement that the law of neutrality applies only in IAC.177
Indeed, the very idea that co-belligerency can be applied to NIAC by
analogy is inconsistent with the law of neutrality; numerous scholars
have pointed out that a state could traditionally invoke neutral rights and
duties with regard to an insurgency only by recognizing the insurgents as
belligerents, thereby – in modern terms – transforming the NIAC into an
IAC. As Tucker says, “operation of the international law of neutrality
presupposes, and is dependent upon, the recognition of insurgents in a
civil war as belligerents. Prior to such recognition – whether by the
parent state or by third states – there can be no condition of belligerency,
175 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 2112–13; see also Robert Chesney, Thoughts on
the Brennan Speech: Scope of the AUMF, CCF, JSOC, and Other Issues, Lawfare (May 2,
2012), available at www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/thoughts-on-the-brennan-speech-
scope-of-the-aumf-ccf-jsoc-and-other-issues/ (arguing that the AUMF must reach the
Haqqani Network, because they “are the NIAC equivalent to a classic ‘co-belligerent’
state”); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the ‘War Against Terrorism’, 78
Int’l Aff. 301, 313 (2002) (“The Taliban – and thus Afghanistan – . . . at the very least,
its position was analogous to that of a neutral state which allows a belligerent to mount
military operations from its territory.”).
176 See Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battleﬁeld? Drones and the Geographical
Scope of Armed Conﬂict, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 65, 83 (2013).
177 See, e.g., Robert W. Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea 200 n. 8
(1955); Oppenheim, supra note 30, at 532; Quincy Wright, The Present Status of
Neutrality, 34 Am. J. Int’l L, 391, 393 (1940); Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law
of Nations: A General History 260 (2005); Kress, supra note 50, at 266–67.
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hence no neutrality in the sense of international law.”178 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence that any state other than
the U.S. has ever invoked the law of neutrality – much less co-
belligerency – in a NIAC.179
Because co-belligerency does not apply in NIAC as a matter of con-
ventional or customary international law, the USG’s adoption of that
concept by analogy to IAC represents nothing more than “domestic
humanitarian law.” But that means the ostensible advantages of the
analogy for the U.S. are illusory: in the absence of a separate NIAC with
those groups, targeting members of al-Qaeda’s “associated forces”
remains subject to the prohibitive rules of IHRL, not IHL.
Indeed, the U.S.’s co-belligerency analogy is ﬂawed in another respect.
As discussed earlier, Goodman’s argument that the U.S. is entitled to
asymmetrically analogize between IAC and NIAC – applying the permis-
sive IHL rules but not the prohibitive ones – depends on the idea,
adopted by the PCIJ in the Lotus case, that “[r]estrictions upon the
independence of States” concerning their domestic law “cannot . . . be
presumed.” We have seen that, because of the rise of competing prohibi-
tive rules of IHRL, the U.S.’s traditional freedom no longer exists in the
realm of targeting and detention; unless the analogized IHL rule has a
basis in customary international law, it cannot displace or modify a
competing rule of IHRL. But even such a customary basis would not
necessarily be enough to justify the co-belligerency analogy. As noted
earlier, although symmetric rule application is not a necessary feature of
IHL – states are always free to adopt asymmetrical rules via convention
or custom – the “default” position is that IHL rules do, in fact, apply
symmetrically in both IAC and NIAC. If that’s the case, the U.S. could
178 Tucker, supra note 177, at 200 n. 8; see also Neff, supra note 177, at 260 (“[T]his
general legal bias in favor of governments against insurgents—in the absence of recog-
nition of belligerency—was already widely accepted in state practice in the nineteenth
century. If, on the other hand, the conﬂict was a civil war in the strict sense of the term,
then the law of neutrality would apply.”); Oppenheim, supra note 30, at 532 (“[R]
ecognition of belligerency alone brings about the operation of rules of neutrality as
between the parties to the civil war and foreign States.”); Wright, supra note 177, at 393
(noting, with regard to third states that assist the government to quell an insurgency,
that “the word neutrality is hardly appropriate”); Note, International Law and Military
Operations Against Insurgents in Neutral Territory, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1127, 1128 n. 4
(1968) (“Strictly speaking, neutrality is a concept which applies only to international
warfare, and its status in a civil war in which the rebels have not been recognized as
belligerents is highly doubtful.”).
179 See Kress, supra note 50, at 267.
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not justify using co-belligerency to target al-Qaeda’s “associated forces”
simply by showing that there is a customary basis for applying the law of
neutrality in NIAC; it would also need to show that customary inter-
national law permits the law of neutrality to be applied asymmetrically in
NIAC. The U.S. is not applying neutrality law in general to its NIAC with
al-Qaeda. On the contrary: it is appropriating only those aspects of
neutrality law that maximize its power to target and detain. And that is
not a coincidence: for reasons I have discussed elsewhere,180 the U.S.
would never apply the entire body of the law of neutrality to NIAC by
analogy, because doing so would cripple its ability to ﬁght al-Qaeda.
Applied symmetrically, for example, the law of neutrality would entitle
members of al-Qaeda to both the combatant’s privilege and POW status
upon capture.181 It would also prohibit the U.S. from establishing or
maintaining military bases on the territory of any state that wanted to
remain neutral in the U.S.’s NIAC with al-Qaeda.182
Finally, as with GC III/AP I membership, applying co-belligerency to
NIAC by analogy is likely to lead to signiﬁcant violations of the jus ad
bellum – at least insofar as the U.S. follows Bradley and Goldsmith’s
approach, which at least one U.S. court has already done.183 As Bothe
notes, in the post-Charter era, “[a]rmed reprisals are generally unlawful.
As a consequence, a reaction against violations of neutrality which would
involve the use of force against another state is permissible only where
the violation of the law triggering that reaction itself constitutes an illegal
armed attack.”184 Bradley and Goldsmith, however, do not limit al-Qae-
da’s “associated forces” to organized armed groups that have attacked the
U.S., either singly or alongside al-Qaeda; in their view, a group qualiﬁes
as an associated force as long as it “systematically violate[s] the laws of
neutrality” by “provid[ing] military resources to al Qaeda or serv[ing] as
fundamental communication links in the war against the United States.”
That is deeply problematic from a jus ad bellum standpoint, because
180 Kevin Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conﬂict with Al-Qaeda,
and It’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 Tex. Int’l L. J. 115–41 (2011).
181 See Hersch Lauterpacht, supra note 34, at 175 (“Given the required conditions of
belligerency as laid down by international law, the contesting parties are legally entitled
to be treated as if they are engaged in a war waged by two sovereign States.”).
182 See Oppenheim, supra note 30, at 559 (noting that the duty of impartiality prohibits a
neutral state from allowing a belligerent to “occupy a neutral fortress”).
183 See Hamlily Memorandum Opinion, supra note 19, at 16.
184 Michael Bothe, The Law of Neutrality, in The Handbook of International
Humanitarian Law 571, 581 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2nd ed. 2009).
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although such “unneutral service” by an organized armed group would
entitle the U.S. to respond by imposing countermeasures, it would not
entitle the U.S. to respond with military force:
A state not originally party to an armed conﬂict will only commit an act of
war, and thus risk making itself a party to the conﬂict, by giving direct
support to the military operations of one of the belligerents. Financial,
political, and intelligence support will not have such an effect.185
The (invalid) co-belligerency analogy, in short, permits the U.S. to
extraterritorially target individuals against whom it cannot lawfully use
force in self-defense – namely, members of organized armed groups that
become an “associated force” by providing al-Qaeda with non-military
support. (The Nusra Front may be an example.186) After all, the point of
the analogy is to allow the U.S. to target members of al-Qaeda’s associ-
ated forces as if they were members of al-Qaeda itself.
3. “Belonging to” and Associated Forces
RyanGoodmanprovides analternative interpretationof “associated forces” –
but one that is no less based on analogy to IAC. In his view, an organized
armed group qualiﬁes as an “associated force” in the U.S./Al-Qaeda NIAC if
it can be said to “belong to” al-Qaeda under Art. 4(a)(2) of GC III:
[T]he law of armed conﬂict stipulates that members of armed groups (e.g.,
AQAP) with a particular relationship to a party to a conﬂict (e.g.,
al-Qaeda) are legitimate targets. Speciﬁcally, Article 50(1) of Additional
Protocol I states that a person cannot be considered a civilian (e.g., for the
purpose of lethal targeting) if he is a member of an organized armed
group with such an association. That association is deﬁned in Article 4(a)
(2) of the POW Convention: “members of other militias and members of
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance move-
ments, belonging to a Party to the conﬂict.” In short, “belonging to” a
185 Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in Id. at 58; see
also Michael Bothe, Neutrality in Naval Warfare: What Is Left of Traditional Inter-
national Law, in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead 387,
396 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja et al. eds., 1991) (“An unneutral service is not
an armed attack, and it thus does not trigger a right of self-defence against the neutral
State. Hence, the ius contra bellum excludes a reaction which would be legal under the
traditional law of neutrality.”); Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion and
Capture in Naval Warfare, 30 Canadian Y.B. Int’l L. 89, 131 (1992) (“[U]nneutral
service performed by a non-belligerent state would not be sufﬁcient to justify the use of
force against that state, since unneutral service is not an armed attack.”).
186 See CRS Report, supra note 169, at 43.
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party to the conﬂict is a form of an associated group, which renders its
members subject to lethal force and detention.187
The “belonging to” analogy is just as problematic as the co-belligerency
analogy – and for the same reasons. First, there is simply no evidence that
Art. 4(a)(2) applies in NIAC. In terms of conventional law, neither CA3
nor AP II mention “belonging to,” even though the former refers to
“armed forces” and the latter (in Art. 1) refers to “organized armed
groups.” Moreover, Goodman cites no state practice – not even by the
U.S., which takes a wider view of the material ﬁeld of NIAC than any
other state – in support of the idea that “belonging to” applies in NIAC as
a matter of customary international law.188 The “belonging to” analogy
thus represents the kind of domestic humanitarian law that is not capable
of displacing or modifying the more restrictive targeting rules of IHL.
Second, although Art. 4(a)(2) of GC III permits members of resistance
organizations who belong to a party to an IAC to be targeted, it also
entitles them to the combatant’s privilege and POW status upon cap-
ture.189 It would thus not be enough for Goodman to establish a custom-
ary basis for applying “belonging to” in NIAC. Because the default
position in IHL is that rules apply to all parties equally, he would have
to show that custom applies “belonging to” to NIAC asymmetrically –
permitting the U.S. to take advantage of its permissions without being
bound by its prohibitions.
Third, and ﬁnally, apply the “belonging to” analogy to the U.S./
al-Qaeda NIAC would create even more serious jus ad bellum problems
than co-belligerency. As Goodman notes, “belonging to” is an easily
satisﬁed standard in IAC; according to the ICRC Commentary to GC
III, the necessary “de facto” relationship between the resistance organiza-
tion and the party to the conﬂict “may ﬁnd expression merely by tacit
agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side
the resistance organization is ﬁghting.”190 Needless to say, if the U.S.
would violate the jus ad bellum by targeting organized armed groups that
187 Ryan Goodman, Al-Qaeda, the Law on Associated Forces and “Belonging To” a Party,
Just Security (October 18, 2003), available at http://justsecurity.org/2191/al-qaeda-
law-forces-belonging-to-party-drones-reports/.
188 Notably, the ICRC study of custom does not indicate that “belonging to” applies in
NIAC. See Customary IHL Study, supra note 4, at Rule 4.
189 Assuming, of course, they satisfy the four criteria mentioned in the provision.
190 ICRC, Commentary on the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War 57 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960).
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become an “associated force” by providing al-Qaeda with non-military
support, it would violate the jus ad bellum by targeting organized armed
groups that become an “associated force” simply by tacitly agreeing to
support al-Qaeda.191
D. Detention
In IAC, conventional IHL both authorizes and regulates detention.
Art. 21 of GC III provides that a state “may subject prisoners of war” –
generally members of the enemy’s armed forces – “to internment.”
Because POWs are presumed to pose a security threat simply by virtue
of their right to participate in hostilities,192 they can be detained without
any kind of review until “the cessation of active hostilities.”193 The
detention of civilians, in turn, is governed by the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention (GC IV). Art. 42(1) permits a state to detain a civilian on its own
territory if its security “makes it absolutely necessary,” while Art. 78(1)
permits a state to detain a civilian in occupied territory if it “considers it
necessary, for imperative reasons of security” – although it is generally
agreed that there is little, if any, substantive difference between the two
standards.194 Civilian detention must end “as soon as the reasons which
necessitated his internment no longer exist”195 and cannot extend
beyond the “cessation of hostilities.”196 GC IV thus requires the detaining
state to continually review whether detention is warranted. For civilians
detained on state territory, the initial decision to detain must be “recon-
sidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative
board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose” and must be
reviewed by the same court or administrative board at least twice per year
thereafter.197 Civilians detained in occupied territory have the right to
191 To be sure, insofar as a “tacit agreement” led an organized armed group to launch its
own armed attack against the U.S., the U.S. could lawfully target members of the group.
In such situations, however, the group’s targetability under the jus ad bellum would in no
way depend on its status as an “associated force.”
192 See ICRC Position Paper, Internment in Armed Conﬂict: Basic Rules and Challenges, at
4 (Nov. 2014), available at www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conﬂict-
basic-rules-and-challenges#.VKvETIqsUmc.
193 GC III, supra note 10, Art. 118(1).
194 See ICRC, Commentary on the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 367 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
195 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, Art. 132(1),
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136.
196 Id., art. 133(1). 197 Id., art. 43(1).
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appeal their detention and, if their detention is upheld, the right to
“periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body
set up by the said Power.”198
In NIAC, by contrast, conventional IHL is largely silent concerning
detention. Unlike GC III and GC IV, neither CA3 nor AP II contain a
provision that authorizes a party to a NIAC to detain anyone – member
of the state’s armed forces, member of an organized armed group, or
civilian.199 The authorization for detention is left to domestic law.200
Moreover, neither CA3 nor AP II speciﬁes any “procedural safeguards
for persons interned in NIAC,” even though they each recognize that
such detention will take place.201 Instead, their purpose “is simply to
guarantee a minimum level of humanitarian treatment for people who
are in fact detained.”202
Because IHL authorizes and regulates detention in IAC but not in
NIAC, the relationship between IHL and IHRL is very different in the
two kinds of armed conﬂict. In IAC, the rules of IHL predominate; as the
ICRC notes, “[a]s the lex specialis crafted speciﬁcally for situations of
armed conﬂict, IHL applicable in IAC is the interpretive tool by means of
which the interplay between this body of norms and HR law may be
determined.203 By contrast, the absence of detention-related rules of IHL
in NIAC means that IHRL predominates under either possible version of
the lex specialis principle – as partial displacement or as norm-conﬂict
resolution. If there is no IHL lex, IHL cannot be lex specialis.204
198 Id., art. 78(2).
199 See, e.g., Expert Meeting on the Supervision of the Lawfulness of Detention During
Armed Conﬂict, University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, at 3
(July 24–25, 2004), available at www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/expert-meetings/2004/
4rapport_detention.pdf; Rona, supra note 40, at 114; Hill-Cawthorne & Akande, supra
note 158; Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), ¶ 251.
200 See, e.g., Expert Meeting on Supervision of Detention, supra note 199, at 3; Hill-
Cawthorne & Akande, supra note 158.
201 ICRC Position Paper, supra note 192, at 6; see also Sassoli, Internment, supra note 54, at
623; Hill-Cawthorne & Akande, supra note 158.
202 Mohammed, supra note 199, ¶ 251.
203 ICRC Position Paper, supra note 192, at 3; Kress, supra note 50, at 262.
204 See, e.g., Sassoli, Internment, supra note 54, at 621 (“As humanitarian law applicable to
non-international armed conﬂict is silent on the procedural regulation of internment, it
would seem clear that in accordance with the lex specialis principle as a maxim of logic,
human rights should step in to ﬁll the gap.”); Expert Meeting on Supervision of
Detention, supra note 199, at 3 (noting that because “the grounds and procedure of
detention” are not regulated by IHL in NIAC, “only national law is relevant, as well as
international human rights law”); Rona, supra note 40, at 114 (“NIAC ﬁghters are mere
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IHRL signiﬁcantly limits the ability of states to detain in NIAC. IHRL
does not categorically prohibit detention; a state is entitled to detain
individuals who commit a criminal offense or pose a legitimate threat
to its security.205 But there is little question that IHRL imposes much
greater procedural restrictions on detention than conventional IHL in
IAC, as the Human Rights Committee made clear in its recent General
Comment No. 35 (Liberty and Security of the Person):
To the extent that States parties impose security detention (sometimes
known as administrative detention or internment), not in contemplation
of prosecution on a criminal charge, the Committee considers that such
detention presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Such
detention would normally amount to arbitrary detention as other effective
measures addressing the threat, including the criminal justice system,
would be available. If under the most exceptional circumstances, a pre-
sent, direct and imperative threat is invoked to justify detention of
persons considered to present such a threat, the burden of proof lies on
States parties to show that the individual poses such a threat and that it
cannot be addressed by alternative measures, and this burden increases
with the length of the detention. States parties also need to show that
detention does not last longer than absolutely necessary, that the overall
length of possible detention is limited, and that they fully respect the
guarantees provided for by Article 9 in all cases. Prompt and regular
review by a court or other tribunal possessing the same attributes of
independence and impartiality as the judiciary is a necessary guarantee
for these conditions, as is access to independent legal advice, preferably
selected by the detainee, and disclosure to the detainee of, at least, the
essence of the evidence on which the decision is taken.206
Three procedural differences between IHRL and IHL in IAC are par-
ticularly critical. First, and most obviously, IHRL security detention
does not distinguish between POWs and civilians; the same protections
apply to both. It is thus not possible under IHRL to detain anyone
without periodic review.207 Second, IHRL entitles all detained individ-
uals to periodic review of their detention by a court or quasi-judicial
criminals under domestic law, and so, rules concerning their detention fall under
domestic law, tempered by international human rights obligations.”).
205 Id., ¶ 15; see also Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Copenhagen Principles on the Handling
of Detainees: Implications for the Procedural Regulation of Internment, 18 J. Conflict &
Sec. L. 481, 485 (2013). Under the ECHR, security detention likely requires derogation.
But that requirement is not germane to this discussion.
206 HRC General Comment 35, supra note 65, ¶ 15.
207 Id. The right to review is also non-derogable. Id., ¶ 67.
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tribunal, whereas IHL only requires periodic review by a court or
“administrative body.” Although the difference between IHRL’s “other
tribunal” and IHL’s “administrative body” is not completely clear, most
scholars agree that the former must be more independent than the
latter.208 Third, and ﬁnally, IHRL makes it difﬁcult, if not impossible,
to justify detaining someone until the end of an armed conﬂict209 –
particularly in a transnational NIAC involving terrorist groups, where
“[n]ot only can we not envision an end to the hostilities, but more
problematic, we have absolutely no way of identifying what that end
might look like.”210
These differences almost certainly explain why the U.S. has consist-
ently relied on analogy to apply IAC-based IHL detention rules in
NIAC.211 They also explain why certain scholars have relied on analogy
to argue that organized armed groups have the right to detain. None of
those analogies, however, withstand critical scrutiny.
1. General Detention Power
The ﬁrst two analogies, which can be addressed together, are unsurpris-
ing: analogizing to IAC to deﬁne the general detention power in NIAC
with regard to organized armed groups and civilians. The U.S. considers
members of organized armed groups to be “unprivileged belligerents”
who “may lawfully be detained until a competent authority determines
that the conﬂict has ended or that active hostilities have ceased”212 –
language that precisely mirrors Art. 118(1) of GC III. Similarly, the U.S.
takes the position that civilians may be interned “for imperative reasons
of security” and must be “released when the reasons that necessitated
208 See, e.g., Hill-Cawthorne, supra note 205, at 208.
209 See, e.g., Fiona de Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human
Rights Fight Back? 192 (2011).
210 Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too
Far, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 1169, 1181 (2011).
211 Cf. Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law,
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂict Research, at 27 (2005), available
at www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf (noting
that “[o]ne of the reasons why the United States administration so obstinately wants
to apply the laws of war to its struggle against international terrorism is, arguably, that it
considers it necessary in that struggle to have recourse to war-like internment which
goes beyond what the human rights supervisory bodies admit outside declared situations
of emergency”).
212 DoD Directive, supra note 11, ¶ 3(f).
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internment no longer exist and a safe and orderly transfer or release is
practicable”213 – the GC IV standard for interning civilians in occupied
territory. Both categories are entitled to period review of their detention
by a “competent authority”214 – another GC IV reference – which must
be a military judge for “unprivileged belligerents held in long-term
detention.”215
Scholars also support the analogies to GC III and GC IV. In
Goodman’s view, for example, because “the Fourth Geneva Convention
does generally contain the most closely analogous rules concerning the
detention of civilians,” it “constitutes the best approximation of IHL rules
when interpretive gaps arise.”216 Similarly, Kress suggests that “[i]n line
with the most recent practice of the USA, in particular,” states are
increasingly likely to adopt an “an ‘armed conﬂict model’ for preventive
detention” in NIAC “through ‘translation’ or analogizing principles from
the laws of war governing traditional” IACs.217
There is, however, an important methodological difference between
Goodman and Kress: while Goodman claims that nothing prevents
the U.S. from applying GC IV’s detention standards in NIAC, Kress
argues – or at least strongly implies – that those standards could only
be applied in NIAC if a sufﬁcient number of states adopted the U.S.’s
analogy to GC IV. In other words, while Goodman believes that the
U.S. analogy is already lex lata, Kress believes that it is currently lex
ferenda that could become lex lata as a matter of customary inter-
national law.
Kress is absolutely right. Nothing in international law would
prohibit states from applying GC IV’s detention regime to NIAC through
convention or custom. Indeed, through convention or custom, states
could apply GC III’s much more detention-friendly regime to members
of organized armed groups, civilians who DPH, and even ordinary
civilians. As discussed earlier, no matter how we understand the lex
specialis principle, a clear and speciﬁc conventional or customary rule
of IHL will have priority in an armed conﬂict – IAC or NIAC – over a
competing conventional or customary rule of IHRL.
213 Id., ¶ 3(m)(5). 214 Id., ¶ 3(m)(1). 215 Id., ¶ 3(i).
216 Goodman, Detention of Civilians, supra note 24, at 50. Interestingly, Goodman does not
explain why the U.S. could not maximize its detention authority by analogizing to GC III
instead of to GC IV. He simply says that GC IV “constitutes the best approximation of
IHL rules when interpretive gaps arise.” If analogy is a legitimate source of IHL,
however, an analogy’s ostensible substantive ﬁt would seem to be irrelevant.
217 Kress, supra note 50, at 264.
the use and abuse of analogy in ihl 279
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316481103.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 07 Jun 2019 at 13:06:50, subject to the Cambridge Core
The problem with the U.S. position is that, as Kress implies, the
available state practice is insufﬁcient to conclude that customary IHL
authorizes detention in NIAC218 – much less that it authorizes deten-
tion by reference to GC III and/or GC IV. The U.S. analogies to IAC
thus fail for the same reason they fail in the context of targeting: an
analogized rule represents domestic humanitarian law, which is not
capable of displacing or even modifying IHRL.219 Detention in NIAC
is simply not an area of international law in which “every State remains
free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”
On the contrary, there are now prohibitive rules of IHRL that, via lex
specialis, deﬁne the limits of NIAC detention. And as we have seen,
those prohibitive rules simply do not permit detention on par with GC
III or GC IV – particularly the kind of indeﬁnite detention that GC III
contemplates.
It is also worth highlighting another problem with the U.S.’s analogy
to GC III: its asymmetry. Although Art. 4 of GC III permits a state to
detain combatants until the end of hostilities, such detainees are entitled
to POW status.220 As we saw in the context of targeting, therefore, it
would not be enough for the U.S. to establish a customary rule extending
GC III’s detention power to NIAC. Because the default position is that
IHL applies symmetrically, it would have to show that custom permits
it to apply the permissive rules of IHL (detention) while ignoring its
prohibitive rules (POW status).
218 See, e.g., Mohammed, supra note 199, ¶ 257 (“I have been shown no evidence of any
recognition by states involved in noninternational armed conﬂicts of IHL as providing
a legal basis for detention. . . . Nor has the MOD pointed to any ofﬁcial statement by
the UK government (or any other government) which suggests that IHL does, or
could, provide a legal basis for detention in any non-international armed conﬂict.”);
Hill-Cawthorne & Akande, supra note 158 (“That the legal basis for detention in
NIACs does not lie in IHL, whether as an implied right or a customary right, is
supported by state practice. . . . If either the applicable treaty provisions or customary
international law could be said to provide a legal basis for detention in NIACs, one
would expect practice generally to conﬁrm this. This does not, however, seem to be
the case.”).
219 SeeHill-Cawthorne & Akande, Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International
Armed Conﬂicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari, EJIL: Talk! (June 2, 2014), available at
www.ejiltalk.org/locating-the-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-con
ﬂicts-a-rejoinder-to-aurel-sari/ (“That IHL should provide such a basis [for detention in
NIAC] as amatter of logic (with which onemay ormay not agree) cannotmake up for this
lack of supporting practice.”).
220 See GC III, supra note 10, Art. 4(A) (deﬁning POWs as “persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy”).
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2. Substantial Support
The U.S. does not believe that it is limited to detaining individuals who
are members of al-Qaeda or one of its associated forces. It also takes the
position that it can detain anyone who “substantially supports” any such
group. The USG thus deﬁnes “unprivileged belligerents” – who may be
detained until “the conﬂict has ended or . . . active hostilities have
ceased” – as “[i]ndividuals who have forfeited the protections of civilian
status by joining or substantially supporting an enemy non-state armed
group in the conduct of hostilities.”221 That position, as the USG openly
acknowledges, is based on analogy to IAC – in particular, to the “persons
accompanying” provision of GC III:
The term “substantial support” covers support that, in analogous circum-
stances in a traditional international armed conﬂict, is sufﬁcient to justify
detention. The term thus encompasses individuals who, even if not
considered part of the irregular enemy forces at issue in the current
conﬂict, bear sufﬁciently close ties to those forces and provide them
support that warrants their detention in prosecution of the conﬂict. See,
e.g., Geneva Convention III, Art. 4.A(4).222
Courts have consistently upheld the U.S.’s right to detain individuals who
substantially support al-Qaeda or its associated forces,223 and at least one
has implicitly adopted the analogy to GC III’s “persons accompanying”
provision. In al-Bihani, the appellant argued that he could not be lawfully
detained because he was nothing more than a “civilian ‘contractor’
rendering services” to one of al-Qaeda’s associated forces.224 The DC
Circuit rejected that argument – but held that he would be detainable
even if he was not a member of that associated force, because substantial
support “clearly include[s] traditional food operations essential to a
ﬁghting force and the carrying of arms.”225
Applying the “persons accompanying” provision in Art. 4(A)(4) of GC
III to NIAC by analogy, however, is no less problematic than applying by
221 DoD Directive, supra note 11, at 14; see also 2012 NDAA, supra note 171, § 1021
(providing that the AUMF’s detention power extends to individuals who provide
substantial support).
222 Quoted in Ryan Vogel, The DoD Detainee Directive and Its Deﬁnition of “Unprivileged
Belligerency,” Just Security (September 22, 2014), available at http://justsecurity.org/
15312/dod-detainee-directive-deﬁnition-unprivileged-belligerency/; see also Lederman
& Vladeck, supra note 23 (“[P]erhaps substantial supporters of enemy forces who are
apprehended while accompanying such forces can be detained on roughly the same
terms as the forces themselves, just as they can be in an international conﬂict.”).
223 See, e.g., Al-Bihani, supra note 20, at 872. 224 Id. at 873. 225 Id.
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analogy Art. 21 of GC III and Arts. 42(1) and 78(1) of GC IV. Conven-
tional IHL limits the detention of “persons accompanying” to IAC, and
there is no evidence that the rule applies in NIAC as a matter of
customary international law. Indeed, as Danner notes, the idea that
individuals who support organized armed groups are detainable in the
same way as members of organized armed groups comes not from IHL,
but from “the domestic law of complicity, which targets those who aid
and abet the principal perpetrators of crimes.”226 The “persons accom-
panying” analogy is thus precisely the kind of domestic humanitarian law
that cannot supplant a competing prohibitive rule of IHRL.
To be sure, IHRL does not necessarily prohibit the U.S. from detaining
individuals who substantially support al-Qaeda or one of its associated
forces. IHRL’s priority simply means that the U.S. must determine the
detainability of a substantial supporter by reference to IHRL – the
“present, direct and imperative threat” standard, in particular – and must
afford anyone thereby detained all of IHRL’s procedural guarantees.
Many actions the USG considers “substantial support” likely satisfy the
IHRL standard, such as ﬁnancing or recruiting for al-Qaeda. Cooking for
an associated force of al-Qaeda, however, clearly does not.
3. Detention by Organized Armed Groups
All of the analogized rules of IHL discussed thus far reﬂect the U.S.’s
desire to maximize its targeting and detention power in NIAC. A few
scholars, by contrast, have relied on analogy expand the power of organ-
ized armed groups – in particular, by contending that GC III entitles such
groups to detain members of the state’s armed forces. Casalin argues, for
example, that because CA3 and AP II do not prohibit detention by
organized armed groups and even seem to contemplate it, the circum-
stances in which such detention is acceptable should be deﬁned “using
the analogous IHL of international armed conﬂict (i.e., the standards of
Geneva Convention III)”:
Detention by armed opposition groups in a situation analogous to those
prescribed by the law of international armed conﬂict would therefore not
be considered arbitrary for want of a legal basis, since Common Article 3
(and, in certain cases, Article 5 of Additional Protocol II) serves
226 Allison M. Danner, Deﬁning Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 Tex.
Int’l L. J. 1, 12 (2007).
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as the preexisting legal grounds for detention. . . . In such a case, Geneva
Convention III would then be used for guidance in interpretation of what
it means to detain in connection with hostilities. This could be considered
a type of “quasi-POW” detention (i.e., imprisonment of enemy ﬁghters
for the purpose of placing them hors de combat).227
The problem with this analogy is a familiar one: a permissive rule applied
to NIAC from solely by analogy to IAC cannot supplant a competing
prohibitive rule of IHRL under any conception of lex specialis. Here such
an IHRL rule clearly exists: namely, that detention in NIAC is permis-
sible only insofar as it is authorized by law.228 Only such authorization
ensures that detention in NIAC is neither arbitrary nor unlawful.229 In
IAC, IHL itself provides the necessary authority to detain; domestic
authorization is not necessary.230 IHL does not, however, authorize
detention in NIAC; the necessary authorization is left to domestic law.
Any attempt to rely on analogy to argue that organized armed groups can
detain members of the state’s armed forces is thus doomed to fail. As
Casalin herself notes, “the domestic law of all states prohibits detention
by armed opposition groups.”231 IHRL thus does not permit organized
armed groups to detain anyone.232
227 Casalin, supra note 54, at 754; see also Sassoli, Internment, supra note 54, at 623
(“Applied by analogy, the humanitarian law of international armed conﬂict allows for
internment and provides for review procedures . . . Given the organizational criteria a
non-state actor must meet to be considered a party to an armed conﬂict, any non-state
actor should be able to fulﬁll these obligations.”).
228 See, e.g., HRC General Comment 35, supra note 65, ¶ 44; Hill-Cawthorne, supra note
205, at 485.
229 See HRC General Comment 35, supra note 65, ¶ 11.
230 ICRC Position Paper, supra note 192, at 4 (noting that this position is “generally
uncontroversial”).
231 Casalin, supra note 54, at 744; see also Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed
Opposition Groups in International Law 66 (2002) (“Human rights treaties pre-
sume the state to be the only authority within the state territory, and under this law the
state, represented by a government, is the only authority entitled to arrest and detain
persons on such grounds and in accordance with the law.”).
232 It is worth noting that Casalin’s reliance on analogy is oddly selective. Although she
believes that IHL permits organized armed groups to detain members of the state’s
armed forces in NIAC, she insists that the detention of civilians continues to be
determined by IHRL. Casalin, supra note 54, at 755. She also argues that analogy to
IAC provides only the authorization to detain members of the state’s armed forces; the
procedural limits on their detention must still be determined by IHRL. Id. Casalin never
explains why, if analogy is permissible, organized armed groups must appropriate only
those aspects of IHL that she ﬁnds normatively desirable.
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Conclusion
Karl Rove once famously accused Democrats who opposed the
Bush Administration’s counterterrorism policies of having a “pre-9/11
mindset.”233 As it turns out, theUSG as awhole has a “pre-1949”mindset –
its consistent reliance on analogy to maximize its ability to target and
detain harkens back to an age before World War II, when non-
international conﬂicts were actually non-international and universal
human rights were nothing more than a gleam in Eleanor Roosevelt’s
eyes. In that Lotus-dominated era, no prohibitive rules of international law
prevented a state from adopting whatever targeting and detention rules it
considered “best andmost suitable” for quelling an insurgency; if it wanted
to look to international armed conﬂict for inspiration, it was free to do so.
The legal landscape, however, has changed dramatically since World
War II. In a NIAC, IHL is no longer the only game in town; both
targeting and detention are also subject – at least potentially – to
IHRL’s prohibitive rules. And NIAC is no longer predominantly non-
international; transnational NIACs are now the norm, not the exception.
Prohibitive rules that protect a state’s sovereignty – the principle of non-
intervention and the prohibition on the use of force – thus also affect
how a state ﬁghts a NIAC.
In our legally overdetermined era of transnational armed conﬂict,
there is simply no room in IHL for analogy between IAC and NIAC.
First and foremost, there is the IHRL problem. IHRL prevents analogy
because analogized rules have no basis in either conventional or custom-
ary IHL; they are simply rules of domestic humanitarian law that cannot
supplant contrary rules of IHRL under any conception of lex specialis.
And then there is the sovereignty problem. Analogized rules may not
necessarily violate the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition
on the use of force; it is always possible to imagine situations in which
self-defense would permit the U.S. to extraterritorially target or detain
individuals who have become targetable or detainable because of a rule
analogized from IAC to NIAC. But there are far more scenarios in which
analogized rules will permit – even encourage – the U.S. to use force
extraterritorially in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of
non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of force. Analogy thus
makes it exceptionally likely, if not actually certain, that the U.S. will
routinely use extraterritorial force unlawfully.
233 Branden Crocker, Over the Top, American Spectator (February 15, 2006).
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The Permanent Court of International Justice held in 1927 that “[r]estric-
tions upon the independence of States cannot . . . be presumed.” That
principle was sound in the era in which it was written. But that is not our
era. In the Age of Rights, the U.N. Charter, and transnational armed conﬂict,
such restrictions no longer have to be presumed – they exist throughout
positive international law.
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